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The Cresset

CORRESPONDENCE
To the Editor of The Cresset:

As a woman who lives and works
with young Americans in their 20s
and 30s, I find it surprising that
Gail Eifrig swallowed the media
hype on the "Yuppie generation"
so
completely
("The
Yuppie
Phenomenon," May, 1985). She admits that she knows only "one or
two of them," which isn't a very
good sample on which to base one's
opinion of an entire generation. If
Ms. Eifrig would venture from her
ivory tower and spend some time
in the real world, she would find
this group of people as diverse as
any other generation. Roger Hickey, a charter member of this
group put his case succinctly in a
recent article in the New York Times:
I may be a young urban professional,
but I'm no yuppie. In fact, very few of
my contemporaries fit the "life style
profile" that has been imposed on us
in the past year or so. Only a very
small percentage of us are stockbrokers or MBAs; many more of us drive
used Toyotas than new BMWs; and
while a few may be making millions in
new high-tech companies, most are living from paycheck to paycheck and
struggling to pay the rent.

Only the very naive, or those into
mass hype, would attempt to pin a
label on a group of people ranging
in age from 21 to 39-roughly onethird of the population of the U.S.
The driving force of self-interest
that is "the fascination of the horrendous" to Ms. Eifrig is the same
force that has been apparent in
every generation since Adam-including that of Ms. Eifrig. For an
insight into the old-hat quality of
today's alleged Yuppie characteristics, here is the description of an
American businessman of the 50s,
written by an incisive social observer of that generation, John P.
Marquand:
October, 1985

He is self-confident. He believes in
being in shape and completes an exercise program every morning. He believes appearances are important and
pays careful attention to his clothes.
He works very hard-twelve-hour days
are common-because that is what it
takes to get ahead. His real loyalty is to
himself-and to the bottom line. He
knows the value of things; brand
names, wines, and antiques. He is a
sophisticated consumer. Though he is
in his early thirties, he is well on the
way to running his own company.

Ms. Eifrig's comparisons of her
(and my) generation to that of the
so-called Yuppies ("We were devoted to doing good within the system . . . they went to demonstrations and love-ins") are self-righteous and, moreover, inaccurate.
They, too, were idealistic and
worked to improve the system;
their generation, more than ours,
helped to launch the civil rights
movement and to end the war in
Viet Nam. If "Yuppies" voted for
Ronald Reagan in overwhelming
numbers in 1984, so did every
other generation of Americans, including Ms. Eifrig's. And far from
being
"devoted
system-haters,"
many observers think that these

young people want to be the establishment-the sooner the better!
If the altruism of this generation
seems to have evaporated or is less
evident today, perhaps we should
look for the causes. The postwar
generation has no choice but to be
hard-working. They entered a depressed job market in huge numbers: twice as many of today's
workers are in the 24 to 35-yearold age group as there were 15
years ago. A little sympathy may be
in order: most young families must
have two incomes to achieve the
good things that former generations of Americans expected as a
matter of course (such as owning
one's own home). Many young
women today do not have the luxury to let the babies come when
they will, and then stay home and
teach them to read, as we did.
The less said about Ms. Eifrig's
admitted jealousy of people who
know how to have a good time, the
better; but I do rather resent her
characterization of my generation
as a bunch of sourpusses who
spend all their time recycling
aluminum cans, who don't have
any fun. And if her principles are
so insecure that they "look tacky"
in the light of other people's
values, she is speaking for herself,
but certainly not for all of us.
Corinne Grotheer Ramming
Darien, Connecticut

On Her Porch in October
When wild high cries of geese
herald the death
of green
things she watches
fixed
immobile in her metal chair
under the beating of dark wings
her dress sunfaded
paisley fingers stiff against disease
Eve paling at the end of a sunset
she smiles
I'm afraid if I touch her
her soul will depart like leaves.

Ramona C. Cramer
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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor

The United Nations at Forty
This month marks the fortieth anniversary of the
founding of the United Nations. Few Americans are
more than vaguely aware of the anniversary, and even
fewer think it a matter of any significance. The sad
thing is that they have little reason to assume otherWise.

It now requires a major effort at historical reconstruction to recall the enormous enthusiasm that accompanied the UN's birth in 1945. Statesmen may
have had their reservations, but to a considerable degree they shared the hopes of ordinary citizens that
the new agency would bring, if not the greening of the
globe, at least unprecedented opportunities for international cooperation and general disarmament. The
concept of collective security seemed not the illusion it
now appears in retrospect but a realistic step toward
world peace. There were critics and skeptics from the
beginning-isolationists, always a significant force in
American politics, thought the UN a dubious venture
in internationalism-but they were greatly outnumbered by those weary of war and eager to seize on any
hope for avoiding it in future.
The Cold War brought a quick end to the idealistic
hopes attending the UN's founding. What had been
intended as a forum for international cooperation
soon became a battleground in the East-West conflict.
Most Americans managed to ignore that development
as long as the UN remained generally sympathetic to
U.S. interests. But when the organization's pro-Western tilt disappeared in the 1960s, Americans came increasingly to understand that the UN was not so much
an agency of internationalism as a showcase for the
continuing competitiveness of the nation-state system.
The emergence of Third World politics at the UN-a
politics whose preoccupation with the heritage of colonialism gave it a distinct anti-Western bias-added to
American suspicions that the world organization was
turning into a most unfriendly place.
By now, skepticism toward the UN has become a
political staple. Supporters of the organization-a
dwindling breed-find themselves on the defensive,
and their arguments for continued American participation normally display more in the way of resigned
acceptance than enthusiastic endorsement. No one
takes too seriously the far Right's perpetual plea to get
the U.S. out of the UN (and vice versa), but neither
does anyone indulge any more in the "last, best hope
of humanity" rhetoric that was once so common in dis4

course concerning the agency.
Much of the prevailing cynicism is justified. Political
activity inevitably manifests a discrepancy between the
moralistic language that surrounds it and the actual
behavior it involves, but at the UN the gap between
rhetoric and reality is so profound that, as the saying
goes, it gives hypocrisy a bad name. Nowhere else does
one hear more concerning peace, justice, and human
rights, and nowhere else are those terms subject to so
much selective application or so much bad faith. The
shortcomings-real and imagined--of certain proWestern nations such as Israel, Chile, and South Africa receive unrelieved attention, while the equivalent
deficiencies of all sorts of squalid tyrannies on the Left
go unremarked.
The awareness of most Americans of these absurd
double standards is indicated by the indifference with
which they respond to the UN's political judgments.
Only on certain egregious occasions-as in the resolutions equating Zionism with racism-do the UN's tendentious predilections receive notice. Most of the time,
the organization's inconsequence is exemplified by the
absence of notice its irresponsibility arouses.
In recent years, the United States has begun to treat
the UN with greater seriousness, even as it has more
openly than usual denigrated its overall significance.
Under former ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, the U.S.
began to respond vigorously to attacks on it within the
UN and to put Third World (and other) nations on
notice that they could no longer oppose America with
impunity or vote regularly against its interests without
those votes affecting bilateral relations. Consistent antiAmerican behavior would not go unnoticed or unpunished. (America's withdrawal from UNESCO,
based mainly on that agency's descent into ideological
politics, stemmed from the same impulses.)
Critics found such attitudes unnecessarily harsh and
vindictive. A great power, they suggested, should magnanimously understand and ignore the attacks, however unjustified, of emerging nations whose insecurity
and fragile identity commonly find expression in formulaic attacks on the "neo-colonialist" West. There is
a point to that criticism. But there is also a point to
the Reagan Administration's rejoinder that we treat
Third World nations with greater respect and dignity
by taking their actions seriously-and acting accordingly-than by indulging them as adolescent societies
whose insignificance for us we demonstrate by dismissing their behavior as beneath serious notice. That kind
of indulgence, after all, expresses its own form of
The Cresset

contempt.
A related issue involves the effects of the Administration's newly-aggressive policies on general public
opinion toward the UN. Critics argue that those
policies recklessly inflame anti-UN attitudes and thus
further weaken the reputation and effectiveness of an
organization already damaged by its low standing with
the American public. Yet it may be that the Administration's policies, whatever their intended effects, act
less to exacerbate criticism of the UN than to disarm
it. Americans may not succumb so readily to arguments that the UN threatens American interests if
they see their government acting vigorously within the
organization to reward its friends and punish its
enemies. A policy in which America is seen actively to
protect its interests within the UN probably does more
good for the organization's standing in public opinion
than one which, by imposing Olympian self-restraint
on American officials, gives the appearance of ineffectuality in furthering national ends.
A new realism towards the UN need not degenerate
into total cynicism. For all its faults, it still serves a
number of useful purposes. If too much of the talk
there is cheap, it does still serve as .a place where nations whose interests have come into conflict can conveniently continue to talk rather than resort to belligerent action. And in situations where the great powers
do not see their own interests directly threatened and
are therefore willing to grant the organization freedom of action , the UN has frequently served as an
arena for reconciliation and as an active keeper of the
peace. Most people, finally, recognize the invaluable
role the UN has played in refugee work, in public
health and economic development, and in a whole
host of humanitarian and social endeavors. If the UN
were to be destroyed, in short, we would feel ourselves
required to reconstruct something very much like it.
If we are to view the UN without illusions, we shall
have to resist imposing on it expectations it cannot be
expected to fulfill . It is in exorbitant expectations that
cynicism most readily breeds. Durable political support
for the UN will have to be based on a clearer understanding than we have previously managed of what it
can reasonably be expected to accomplish.
We might begin by recognizing that the lofty internationalist norms by which we have judged the UN
make little sense in a world where nationalism reigns
supreme and the nation-state system can be expected
to prevail into the foreseeable future. Those who insist
that we must learn to think of ourselves primarily as
citizens of the world and fellow passengers on
spaceship earth fa~e insuperable political and emotional obstacles in achieving their ends. We lack the
imaginative resources to transcend the national/patriotOctober, 1985

ic attachments that help form our social identities,
and, more importantly, we have not the vaguest idea
how we might construct an international political
order of real substance that would not immediately become an intolerable tyranny.
That is not to say, of course, that the nations of the
world cannot cooperate for certain common ends.
There are global problems with which we are all familiar that will require common attention and action, and
there the UN can continue to play a useful, if limited,
role. A wise sense of the national interest will include
considerable space for international cooperation. But
that is a quite different thing from the dream of fundamental transcendence of nationalism that lay behind
the more extravagant hopes of the UN's founders and
that continues to serve as the basis of the internationalist perspective. Wendell Willkie's vision of One
World may have imaginative value in reminding us of
the limits and dangers of nationalism, but taken literally it remains a utopian illusion .
The abiding problem is power. All political orders
involve the use of power, and if there is one thing that
political modernity has taught us it is that the premier
danger of politics is the danger of concentrated power.
The conundrum of internationalism thus becomes obvious: in an age where we fear that national power has
grown beyond our capacity to control, how can we
even begin to contemplate the dangers inherent in the
creation of effective transnational power? For Americans, the specter of such power becomes all the more
fearful when we recognize that under current conditions any likely international order would fall under
the control of ideological forces indifferent or even
antipathetic to the political values we most cherish.
The UN, then, must continue to operate in restrictive circumstances. It upholds an internationalist
beacon in a nationalist world, and that beacon serves
both as an incentive to rouse us from our parochialism
and as a temptation to consolidated power that we
need sedulously to resist. At a less grandiose level of
analysis, friends of the UN will have to recognize that
the U.S. (or any other nation) cannot reasonably be
expected to check its national interest at the organization's door, and that the UN will consequently remain
as much an arena of national conflict as a source of
international comity. We can struggle for a relatively
more just and peaceful international order, but we expect more than that at our moral and political peril.
Reinhold Niebuhr instructed us long ago that the
path of decent politics follows the narrow road between cynicism and sentimentality. If we apply that
wisdom unblinkingly to the United Nations, the less
embittered we might become over its large failures ,
the more grateful for its small triumphs.
Cl
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Gilbert Meilaender

C. S. LEWIS RECONSIDERED
Can Christian Apology Withstand Rational Appraisal?

In the rite of baptism the sign of the cross is placed
"upon the forehead and the breast" of the baptized
one. That is to say, both the mind and the heart are
claimed by and offered to the God who has revealed
himself as the Crucified One. But the task of offering
mind and heart to God-and offering them in concert-is lifelong. Perhaps some day reason and imagination, intellect and passion, will be reconciled, but
even in the experience of believers the cleavage between them is often deep and some conflict inevitable.
Few Christian writers in this century have managed
to speak as effectively to both mind and heart as did
C. S. Lewis. Some readers have been attrac~ed by the
persuasive force of the reasoned argument he provides; others have been drawn in through his
metaphors, analogies, and stories, and have had their
imaginations baptized by his writings even as he said
his had been by the books of George MacDonald . In
C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, a book
published recently this year by Eerdmans, John Beversluis examines Lewis' arguments in behalf of religious belief and finds them sorely wanting. On Beversluis' reading, Lewis displayed toward the end of
his life a "divided mentality, a mentality at odds with
itself'-no longer able to find persuasive arguments
for what he still desperately wanted to believe.
It must be said at the outset that Beversluis' book is
not very good; indeed, one wonders whether
Eerdmans, having been identified for so long with
books largely favorable toward Lewis, is doing any-

Gilbert Meilaender is Associate Professor and Chairman of
the Department of Religion at Oberlin College. His most recent book is The Theory and Practice of Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). He is also the author of
The Taste for the Other: The Social and Ethical
Thought of C. S. Lewis (Eerdmans, 1978). H e is a frequent contributor to The Cresset.
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thing more than seeking the respectability that comes
from showing that it too can be critical. Still, Beversluis does focus on some of Lewis' central arguments, and we can use his book to reconsider Lewis'
case for Christianity. First, though, at least a few of
the book's defects call for notice.
One of the problems with Beversluis' work is that he
pays little attention to Lewis' imaginative writings and,
in particular, to a book like Till We Have Faces-this
despite the fact that he has surely read them and must
know them well. Beversluis says that he will focus · on
Lewis' apologetic writings. But with Lewis the imaginative works are part of the apology, and to ignore them
is to skew one's reading considerably. The author who,
recounting his own conversion, could focus on the
baptism of his imagination through reading a fantasy,
who could claim (only partly with tongue in cheek)
that anyone who did not wish to become a believer
had better be careful what authors he read , who at the
conclusion of one of his own fantasies could suggest
that what moderns need is not new beliefs but new images, who could forthrightly state that in writing his
children's stories he was (among other things) trying to
steal past the "watchful dragons" that keep us from
believing-such an author's "apology" for Christianity
cannot be found only in books with titles like ·Miracles
or The Problem of Pain.
Lewis once wrote that while reason was the organ of
truth, imagination w·as the organ of meaning. And
since Beversluis is interested not only in the truth but
also in the meaningfulness of religion (we are treated
by him to a short discussion of the verification/falsification debate in twentieth-century philosophy), he cannot capture the full force of Lewis' views apart from
the imaginative writings.
Beversluis writes, he tells us, to rescue Lewis from
the "excessive hostility" of his fierce critics but also
from the "excessive loyalty" of his uncritical admirers.
Not that Lewis' admirers are entirely to be blamed ; his
crisp, no-nonsense prose has perhaps seduced them.
Still more, they Jack the training and sophistication
The Cresset

needed to see through Lewis' glibness. "The people to
whom he primarily addresses himself are not trained
in philosophy; they are on the whole simply not in a
position to recognize his distortions, omissions, and
oversimplifications." Good to have Beversluis around
to help! This despite the evidence that can be found
in Beversluis' own citations to show that most of the
arguments Lewis put forward in his books aimed at
"popular" audiences can also be found in essays delivered at places like the Socratic Club in Oxford, where
the famous exchange between Lewis and the
philosopher G. E. M. Anscombe about Lewis' refutation of naturalism took place.

John Beversluis is in no position to
damn Lewis for oversimplifying; one
senses in his theological excursions
the remains of some Calvinistic
Sunday School lessons imperfectly
nuanced. Still, even a bad book may
treat important issues, and this does.

Beversluis tells us that Lewis often wrote irresponsibly, not taking the pains necessary to understand the
views he was rejecting. This is a strange criticism from
an author who himself has a disconcerting tendency to
tell his readers in no uncertain terms what a biblical
or orthodox view is. He tells us-discussing Lewis'
"lord-or-lunatic" dilemma-that the Jews of Jesus' day
may have regarded him as a blasphemer but certainly
not a madman. Perhaps he should consideer Mark
3:21. For Beversluis the view (not just of Lewis but of,
say, Augustine and Dante) that God is the One whom
all truly desire has "not a shred of evidence in the
Bible" to support it. Perhaps he should become acquainted with the Gospel of John. He writes , citing I
Corinthians l:2lff., that Christianity and hellenistic
philosophy are irreconcilably opposed; yet, we might
wonder whether the Logos of John's Gospel can be entirely alien to "his own" creation to which he came.
An author who holds that "in the Bible" human beings and God do not share "a common moral world"
and that to be a Christian one must simply "bow the
head and bend the knee" but never raise a question
needs to be asked once again what St. John means in
saying that the Logos came to "his own," what the significance of incarnation is. Beversluis is in no position
to damn Lewis for oversimplifying; one senses in his
theological excursions the remains of some Calvinistic
Sunday School lessons imperfectly nuanced. These :reOctober, 1985

mains could lead to a rejection of God-or as easily to
some form of "revelation positivism."
Beversluis tells the reader that among Lewis' most
serious weaknesses as an apologist was "his fondness
for the false dilemma." Yet his own book fairly bristles
with one dilemma after another which supposedly confronts Lewis. He is surprised that Lewis should describe God both as the One for whom our hearts long
and as One from whom we shrink. In thus describing
our relation to God Lewis may or may not be correct,
but he is simply reworking a common Christian understanding of what it means to be both a creature made
by and for God and a fallen creature living a lie by
seeking to be independent of God. To need and long
for God while in pride denying our neediness is a relatively common description of the state of the sinful
creature, at least in the Augustinian strand of Christian thought. On this view our sinfulness is displayed
precisely in the fact that we are thus torn and divided
and cannot love God with a whole heart. To be sure,
there are difficult issues here, and much of the literature about the relation of agape and eros probes these
issues both historically and philosophically. But Beversluis, in the grip of an understanding of sin which
imagines that depravity could not possibly leave any
place for desire for God, can find here only a dilemma: "Either God is the ultimate Object of desire or
he is not. If he is, then it makes no sense to talk about
shrinking from him the moment he is found. If he is
not, then we will not find our heart's desire by following Joy any more than mice will find theirs by pursuing the cat." A writer who thinks this theologically
sophisticated must simply be left to his own devices
while the rest of us spend time reading Nygren, Burnaby, and D'Arcy-not to mention Augustine. This is
only one example of Beversluis' use of dilemmas, but
perhaps Lewis' admirers may be excused for wondering whether the false dilemma is easily avoided.
Still, though, a bad book may treat important issues,
and Beversluis does. He focuses on three sorts of arguments Lewis offers for belief in God. Two of
them-arguments from the nature of reason and the
nature of morality-are quite similar; a third-an argument based on what Lewis called longing for joy-is
rather different. Each is worth thinking through as
Beversluis has tried to do.
Lewis attempts-in Mere Christianity and several of
his essays-to argue from the nature of our moral experience to the existence of a divine being, what in
Mere Christianity he calls "a Something which is directing the universe, and which appears in me as a law
urging me to do right and making me feel responsible
and uncomfortable when I do wrong." Beversluis correctly notes that Lewis' version of the moral argument
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depends upon two claims: that morality itself is objective, and that an objective moral law must be
grounded in a supernatural reality. Lewis begins by
noting that almost all our moral arguments presuppose certain principles. Quarreling, as opposed to
fighting, loses its point unless we have some shared
standard in the light of which to conduct our argument. These standards-what Lewis calls the law of
nature in Mere Christianity-cannot be subjective; that
is, they cannot be grounded ultimately in our tastes,
preferences, attitudes, or decisions. Not if moral argument is to be meaningful.
Thus far so good, I think-though Beversluis does
not. He contends that, when Lewis argues that subjectivist moral theories cannot account for our sense of
moral obligation or the possibility of moral argument,
he is guilty of "irresponsible writing." "To give vent to
so ill-considered an opinion is to betray either that one
knows next to nothing about ethical theory or that one
simply chooses to ignore inconvenient points of view."
(A dilemma again! It is my duty to remind the reader
that Beversluis seeks only to rescue Lewis from the excessive hostility of some of his critics.)
Lewis is mistaken, Beversluis contends, because he
overlooks objectivist moral theories (from Aristotle to
the utilitarians) which have gotten along quite well
without any grounding in the supernatural. One suspects, however, that Beversluis has missed an important point. The long list of such objectivist but possibly
naturalistic moral theories which he offers is, for the
most part, a list of normative ethical theories. Almost all
of them could be held, as a normative position, by
either a subjectivist or an objectivist. Lewis' point in
this argument is not normative but metaethical. It is
that, whatever our normative ethic may be, we will not
do justice to our moral experience if we hold it as a
matter of taste or preference, attitude or decision of
principle. Naturally, this claim is arguable and has
often been argued, but it is neither silly nor naive. I
suspect, indeed, that it is correct.
But a moral argument for that Something directing
the universe needs more than the case for an objective
moral law; it. needs a Lawgiver. And Lewis does not,
I think, satisfactorily bridge this gap. Contrary, however, to what Beversluis and some other readers have
thought, I am less certain that Lewis really thought he
had bridged it. How get from the objective moral law
to the divine lawgiver? In Miracles Lewis suggests that
if our conscience were itself a product of nature
(which is nonmoral) , we could have no confidence in
the objectivity of its judgments. What he means, I
think, is clearer in Mere Christianity, and it is essentially
a claim about what best makes sense of our moral experience. Knowing ourselves to be under a moral law,
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we have learned something about ourselves that we
know only as "insiders." An external observer studying
human behavior could only chart what we do; for an
understanding of our sense that we act in accord with
a sense of obligation he would have to rely on our own
reports.
That is to say, studying human beings in the way we
might study cabbages, trees, earthquakes, tides,
glaciers, or (probably) wolves will not account for
human moral experience. We cannot explain it in
terms of natural phenomena or the methods by which
we examine those phenomena. We can account for it
only if we assume that there is more to human nature
than can be found in the rest of the natural world.
And therefore-and here is the gap that is not, I
think, really bridged-we cannot account for human
nature if we understand it as the product of the rest
of nature. We can account for our moral experiencea surd in the rest of the natural world--only if we assume that Something beyond the natural world directs
and communicates with us through our sense of moral
obligation .

Studying human beings in the way we
might study cabbages, trees,
earthquakes, tides, glaciers, or
(probably) wolves will not account
for human moral experience. We cannot
account for it in terms of natural
phenomena or natural methods.

I agree with Beversluis that this final move, at least
as I have described it, is not rationally conclusive. But
there is more than that to be said about it. For one
thing, if as an argument it is not conclusive, as a "consideration sufficient to determine the intellect" (to use
Mill's phrase), it may still be weighty. What is worth
noting is the way in which Lewis here appeals to an
impulse that is very basic to religious belief. If he is
not giving us an argument which admits of no disagreement, he is providing some sense of why believers of many stripes have felt that the "lower" cannot
explain the "higher," however much the great
evolutionary myth (whose funeral oration Lewis composed in one of his essays) may claim that it can.
It is not logically impossible that the lower should
ground the higher, but Lewis has offered one sort of
consideration which may help us explain our uneasiness with the idea that it does. He is asking us to imagine the universe in two quite different ways and
The Cresset

consider, then, which most plausibly accounts for our
experience-and, in particular here, our moral experience. Notice that this is in many ways not simply an
argument but an exercise of the imaginative powers
something like that suggested by Lewis in The Discarded
Image when he described the medieval model of the
umverse.
If the reader will suspend his disbelief and exercise his imagination . . . even for a few minutes, I think he will become
aware of the vast readjustment involved in a perceptive reading of the old poets. He will find his whole attitude to the
universe inverted. In modern, that is, in evolutionary,
thought Man stands at the top of a stair whose foot is lost in
obscurity; in this, he stands at the bottom of a stair whose top
is invisible with light.

It is possible that Lewis never really decided
whether he was offering only an argument which appealed to logic or whether he was offering something
more like a consideration which might incline the intellect to a certain view. At certain places--chiefly in
Miracles and Mere Christianity-it seems to be the
former. But in The Problem of Pain he clearly states
that coming to think of morality in the way he does
is not required by logical reasoning alone. Someone
may refuse, he says, "if not without violence to his own
nature, yet without absurdity." We may miss the truth
to which our moral experience points, but there is no
logical argument which can compel us to see it. Similarly, in his essay "Transposition," he suggests that we
may deliberately refuse "to understand things from
above" and continue to inhabit a natural world which
is "all fact and no meaning." It is imagination that is
the organ of meaning, and we can refuse to image the
world in certain ways.
Most important of all, in The Abolition of Man-a
book sadly underrated and in some ways misunderstood by Beversluis-Lewis, having put forward an
argument for the objectivity of moral norms, writes: "I
may add that though I myself am a Theist, and indeed
a Christian, I am not here attempting any indirect argument for Theism." If this contradicts, as it may, the
thrust of his argument in Mere Christianity, it is
nevertheless more likely to be his considered position.
In an essay, "The Poison of Subjectivism," he likewise
declines to move from the existence of the moral law
to the existence of God (for the very good theological
reason that this might seem to make God bound by
the moral law), and he contents himself with laying
down "two negations: that God neither obeys nor creates
the moral law." And, of course, if God does not create
the moral law, logic cannot require that we move from
the existence of that law to the existence of God.
Lewis' argument from reason is very much like his
argument from morality. He argues-in many of his
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essays and, especially, in chapter 3 of Miracles-that we
could never trust the conclusions our rational powers
reach if reason itself could be fully accounted for as
the result of irrational causes-which, according to
Lewis, means that reason could not be explained if it
were the product of nature. To account for reason we
must suppose that there is a realm other than the natural. It is this argument that triggered the famous exchange between Lewis and Elizabeth Anscombe, an exchange which Beversluis recounts.
Anscombe targeted two points at which Lewis' argument was particularly vulnerable. She noted that to say
that reason was the product of nature might be to say
that it had nonrational causes, but that was quite different from holding that it was irrationally caused.
This objection, though on target, is easily dealt with.
One simply changes the argument to read non- rather
than ir-rational. But this leaves us with the more crucial issue: Is it plausible that our rational faculty
should have grown out of or been produced by a
"lower," nonrational world? Anscombe argued that
there was no logical reason why this should not happen. For Lewis to claim, as he had, that the validity of
our reasoning (and the naturalist's reasoning) would
be undercut if reason were the product of nonrational
nature was, Anscombe correctly noted, to confuse
reasons and causes. Whatever the cause of our reasoned
conclusions, their validity cannot be determined simply
by tracing the causes which moved us to think this
way.
The old joke about the man whose car got a flat tire
in front of a mental institution makes Anscombe's
point: Changing the tire, the man had the misfortune
to have all four lugs roll off the road and into a ditch
where he could not find them. Cursing his misfortune,
the man was helped by the timely suggestion of an inmate who had been watching. Why not, the resident
of the institution suggested, take one lug from each of
the other three wheels and secure each tire with three
lugs until he could get to the nearest town. The obvious sanity of this solution impressed the man and he
thanked the inmate while quite obviously failing to
keep from his face a look of surprise that such a rational solution should have come from this source.
"Well look," responded the inmate, "I may be mad,
but I'm not crazy." Who knows why he offered the
suggestion, what delusion may have led him to intervene? Whatever the cause, the rationality of his suggestion did not depend on it.
Lewis realized that Anscombe had fingered a serious
weakness in the argument, which he revised in a later
edition of Miracles. But he continued to believe that
the argument had a point. An argument's validity, he
granted, is a function solely of the structure of the ar-
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gument itself. That validity cannot be determined by
investigating the causes which led the arguer to think
in this way. Nevertheless, Lewis noted , when I think a
valid thought, the event of my thinking (though not
the thought's validity) is subject to explanation in
terms of nonrational causes. Suppose my thinking this
(valid) thought can be fully accounted for in terms of
nonrational causes, is this ground for worry? Lewis
thought so; for in that case it would be a felicitous but
accidental circumstance if I happened to be caused to
think what (on other grounds having to do with the
structure of the argument) we know to be true.
That Lewis has a point seems clear, though here, as
in the argument from morality, I think it is not so
much a conclusive argument as a consideration which
might help to determine the intellect. Beversluis, on
the other hand, thinks it largely worthless. He notes
that events can be explained in many different ways
and from many points of view. They can even, he
says, be "fully" explained from any given point of view
without invalidating other perspectives.
Take the string quartets of Beethoven. There is a sense in
which one would be on perfectly safe ground in claiming that
they can be fully accounted for in purely causal terms. Beethoven, one might say, composed them because of an irresistible creative urge that allowed him to do nothing else even
to the point of neglecting his health and business affairs. He
was "driven" to compose music. In this sense, his string quartets are, in principle, fully explicable in terms of his
psychological and temperamental makeup. Fully but not
merely.

"Fully means 'exhaustively' only from a particular point of
view." Other explanations, almost without limit, are
also possible:
He needed extra money, he was bent on convincing his critics
that his deafness had not deprived him of his creative talent,
he was trying to catch up with Haydn, he was obsessed with
composing for string instruments, and so on. All these explanations "fully explicate" the composition of the quartets. But
they are not mutually exclusive. They are not even in competition.

Beversluis' view is .possible, but hardly as obvious as he
suggests. Not everyone will be satisfied to understand
"fully" to mean "exhaustively, but only from a particular point of view." For this leads to the possible but
puzzling circumstance which continued to worry
Lewis: that the event of my thinking a true thought
(true according to the canons of rational argument)
might be fully explained as the product of nonrational
causes. Possible-and therefore Lewis can offer no
conclusive argument to the contrary. Possible, but a
felicitous happenstance-and therefore Lewis does
offer a consideration which might again lead one to
wonder whether anything less than Reason could explain reason, whether the "higher" could be
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adequately explained in terms of the "lower." Lewis
would never have denied that our thinking was conditioned by many nonrational causes, but he continued-with good reason-to puzzle over a view
which tried to "fully explain" thought in such terms.
Lewis' third argument is quite a different one, and
it grows out of the Augustinian and Romantic elements in his thought; it is the argument from desire.
Here again, Beversluis sees that the argument is not a
conclusive proof, but he is largely blinded to its significance. The theme of "longing for joy" is present in
many of Lewis' writings and is developed most systematically in Pilgrim's Regress, Surprised by joy, and
"The Weight of Glory." It is, in large part, St. Augustine's theme: "you have made us for yourself, and our
hearts are restless until they can find peace in you."

People may try various possible
satisfactions, but these will all
fail to satisfy. They will then, if
they are honest to their experience,
be led to conclude that the human
heart must be made for a joy greater
than any finite object.
Beversluis creates distinctions which are for the most
part artificial between Lewis' development of this
theme in different writings. The nature of the argument itself is reasonably clear: Human beings, if they
will investigate honestly the longing of their hearts,
will find within themselves a desire which no finite object can satisfy. They may try various possible satisfactions-pleasure, power, knowledge, fame-but these
will all, finally, fail to satisfy. They will then, if they
are honest to their experience, be led to conclude that
the human heart must be made for a joy greater than
any finite object.
Now it is no very powerful philosophic achievement
to see the weakness in this argument, stated as baldly
as I have put it. Lewis himself sees, as Beversluis
notes, that the argument will work only if we add the
premise which Lewis several times quotes from Aristotle: "nature makes nothing in vain." If we find ourselves with a longing which no finite object can satisfy,
and if such a longing natural to human nature cannot
be in vain and must have its fulfillment, then it is
reasonable to conclude that there must be something
beyond the natural world which will satisfy this longing. This is a reasonable conclusion but not the only
possible conclusion. We might also conclude-as has
The Cresset

been the modern fashion-that the world is absurd and
the human being a vain and futile creature, driven by
a longing which cannot be satisfied. We might picture
the human being not as St. Augustine did but as the
Faustian man who could never find a moment in
which to rest the heart, a moment so lovely that he
would say to it: "stay a while." Lewis recognizes this
possibility but thinks there is good reason (even if not
conclusive reason) to side with Augustine. He raises
the question and offers his answer in a paragraph in
"The Weight of Glory."
Do what they will, then, we remain conscious of a desire
which no natural happiness will satisfy. But is there any
reason to suppose that reality offers any satisfaction to it?
"Nor does the being hungry prove that we have bread ." But
I think it may be urged that this misses the point. A man 's
physical hunger does not prove that that man will get any
bread; he may die of starvation on a raft in the Atlantic. But
surely a man's hunger does prove that he comes of a race
which repairs its body by eating and inhabits a world where
eatable substances exist. In the same way, though I do not believe (I wish I did) that my desire for Paradise proves that I
shall enjoy it, I think it a pretty good indication that such a
thing exists and that some men will. A man may love a
woman and not win her; but it would be very odd if the
phenomenon called "falling in love" occurred in a sexless
world.

Beversluis, commenting on just this paragraph, insists-rightly, no doubt-that the fact of hunger does
not prove there is food. But would we be entirely
foolish and unreasonable to think, with Lewis, that it
offers "a pretty good indication" that there is something like food? We would not. Though, to be sure,
we would from the start be presupposing that our universe was not a vain and futile place-presupposing,
that is, something like the end we hoped to demonstrate.
The argument is really an invitation, and it is no accident that "The Weight of Glory" is a sermon in
which Lewis admits that he is trying "to weave a spell."
But, as he tells his listeners, "remember your fairy
tales. Spells are used for breaking enchantments as
well as for inducing them. And you and I have need
of the strongest spell that can be found to wake us
from the evil enchantment of worldiness which has
been laid upon us for nearly a hundred years." For
Beversluis, however, the argument is "simply adolescent disenchantment elevated to cosmic status." Well,
that is possible. But if the argument is an invitation,
we will have to consider it and see what we think.
Lewis does not suppose that he is exploring an experience which is solely his own or just having an attack
of adolescent nostalgia. He supposes that if we
examine our heart we will find there-manifested no
doubt in quite different ways-the longing he writes of
and seeks to evoke.
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At a lesser level we could say of his argument here
what Dorothy Sayers wrote of Dante: "The Commedia
is at the same time intensely personal and magnificently public. . .. Dante's experience is personal, but
it is not in the least private; it is universal, and he intends it to be thus understood." Dante's love for Beatrice leads him to God, but, of course-and this is part
of Beversluis' criticism-some loves might lead away
from rather than to God. How shall we distinguish
that desire which is truly part of our created nature,
the desire for the fulfillment proper to creatures such
as we are, the desire for God-how distinguish this
from desires which, because they finally lead away
from God, must be termed profoundly unnatural?
Sayers offers a clue: "There is no more insidious
enemy of the true Beatrice than the false Beatrice who
bears to her so deceptive a superficial likeness. The
two are distinguished most readily and surely by their
effects-the false images turning for ever inwards in
narrowing circles of egotism; the true working for
ever outwards to embrace the Creator and all creation." There again, in effect, is the invitation: to see
whether any object other than God can truly satisfy
the desire of our heart and, in satisfying it, enrich,
broaden, and purify our love.
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As an apologist for the faith, Lewis does more than
offer these three arguments for believing in God's
existence; he also considers-and is troubled by-one
of the strongest arguments against God's existence: the
fact of evil and pain in our world. We are tempted to
think that a God both wholly good and all-powerful
should have been able to do better. One of Lewis' first
apologetic works, The Problem of Pain, was devoted to
this question, and he continued to probe it in some of
his later writings, especially Till We Have Faces and A
Grief Observed.

Beversluis, ever given to simplifying matters for his
non-philosophical readers, divides the possibilities into
two positions, which he terms Platonist and Ockhamist.
The Platonist in his sense "holds that the term good
when applied to God cannot mean something radically
different from what it means when applied to men."
If God is to be called good, it will have to be in our
ordinary sense, and there can be no special pleading
that permits God to do what we ordinarily call evil.
For the Ockhamist in Beversluis' sense, the word "good
when applied to God does mean something radically
different from what it means when applied to human
beings." Beversluis is persuaded that an orthodox
Christian must be an Ockhamist. "Orthodox Christians
unhesitatingly affirm that obedience to God is absolute
and unconditional. He is to be obeyed because he is
God, not because we have judged him good by some
human standard." (Again, we should keep reminding
ourselves that it is Lewis who is guilty of oversimplification.)
Indeed, the Platonist and Ockhamist positions, thus
described, so fully circumscribe the boundaries of possible positions that Beversluis can quickly confront
Lewis with a dilemma: "either Lewis is a Platonist or
he is not. If he is, then he should insist upon the ordinary meanings of ethical terms and draw whatever
conclusions about God's goodness they require. If he
is not, then he is of course free to redefine ethical
terms in any way he sees fit. But in redefining them,
he is no longer operating within our shared moral vocabulary .. .. "
Beversluis contends that late in his life Lewis tried
to switch from his earlier Platonist view. Overcome by
grief at the loss of his wife, Lewis struggled to believe
that God was good in the face of such loss-and finally, and somewhat pathetically, held on to faith by
declining to judge God according to our ordinary standards of goodness. This, at any rate, is Beversluis'
claim. The shift in Lewis' thinking comes in A Grief
Observed, or, more precisely pinpointed, half way
through the book. In the first half of the book Lewis
is still the old Platonist; in the second half "everything
changes" and he switches to an Ockhamist view. True,
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even in the last half of the book his acceptance of Ockhamism is "half-hearted"; of course, he still casts
"wistful backward glances at the Platonic view"; indeed, he himself "was apparently not aware of the decisive reversal of his thought in the second half of this
book."
What shall we say of this thesis? That Beversluis'
credentials as a serious expositor are more than ever
in doubt. Lewis may or may not have managed to deal
effectively with the problem of evil, but Beversluis' argument can hardly be accepted. It is important to remember that for Lewis there is no problem of pain except for the believer. We do not come to faith only if
we solve this problem; rather, having been driven to
believe on other grounds, we then have two awkward
facts-pain and God-with which to come to terms.
We may say that faith "creates, rather than solves, the
problem of pain, for pain would be no problem unless
side by side with our daily experience of this painful
world, we had received what we think a good assurance that ultimate reality is righteous and loving."
If, then, we come to believe in a God of goodness,
love, and mercy, how shall we deal with the fact of
pain? Lewis was never either Platonist or Ockhamist in
the simple senses used by Beversluis. In The Problem of
Pain Lewis set forth a position which, though he
deepened, he never gave up. God's goodness cannot
be utterly different from our understanding of goodness, for then we could mean little by calling him
good. Yet, at the same time, any believer will admit
that what seems to us good may often not really be
good in the eyes of a holy and wise God. This means
that the believer, having experienced not only pain but
also the goodness and beauty of his Lord, is committed to a journey, a pilgrimage: gradually coming to
know better the God whose goodness he trusts. The
image of growth was present already in The Problem of
Pain, where Lewis uses an analogy from human experience. Suppose that a "man of inferior moral standards enters the society of those who are better and
wiser than he and gradually learns to accept their standards," how shall we describe his journey into selfunderstanding? He does not think that he has simply
been asked to give up his own views about goodness;
rather, he sees that he is gradually moving in the direction of greater goodness. His standards are gradually transformed and, sometimes, even reversed, but
he himself recognizes that he is moving toward the
good.
lt is in the light of such experiences that we must consider
the goodness of God. Beyond all doubt, His idea of "goodness" differs from ours; but you need have no fear that, as
you approach it, you will be asked simply to reverse your
moral standards. When the relevant difference between the
Divine ethics and your own appears to you, you will not, in
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fact, be in any doubt that the change demanded of you is in
the direction you already call "better." The Divine "goodness"
differs from ours, but it is not sheerly different: it differs
from ours not as white from black but as a perfect circle from
a child's first attempt to draw a wheel. But when the child has
learned to draw, it will know that the circle it then makes is
what it was trying to make from the very beginning.

One could devote a lifetime to learning to draw that
perfect circle, and, similarly, the believer devotes an
entire life to coming to know better the goodness-indeed, the strange goodness-of God. The believer is
not likely to-and certainly need not-live out this
journey in the way Beversluis says an "orthodox Christian" must: "Good soldiers do not raise searching questions about their orders; they obey them." The believer may prefer familial imagery: loving the parent,
and being assured on other grounds that the parent
wishes nothing but good for him, he may nevertheless
often struggle to trust the parent whose goodness is
not mere kindness and is not, therefore, always readily
apparent.

lewis powerfully depicts the necessary
but painful transformation of our
natural loves as they are taken up
into a life of love for God. This
process, the conversion of our natural
loves into modes of charity, "will
always involve a kind of death."
Lewis' later writings powerfully depict such struggle.
If God intends that we should reach the fulfillment
for which we are created, that we should delight fully
in and give ourselves wholly to him, our swollen egos
are often reluctant to see this journey through. For
Lewis our reluctance is usually grounded in possessiveness. To put it simply, we love other things and people
more than we love God, and we struggle with all our
might to hang on to them and find a sense in which
to call them "ours." They are created goods, gifts of
God, and it is not bad to love them; indeed, not to feel
"the tether and pang of the particular" would be less
than human. But because, in St. Augustine's terms, we
love them inordinately, we suffer when we lose themeven if that loss is part of our journey toward fulfillment in God.
In The Four Loves Lewis powerfully depicts the
necessary but painful transformation of our natural
loves as they are taken up into a life of love for God.
This process, the conversion of our natural loves and
transformation of them into modes of charity, "will alOctober, 1985

ways involve a kind of death." But here again, painful
as this "kind of death" may be, Lewis sees it as part
of the believer's pilgrimage toward God, part of the
journey by which we come to know better the goodness of God. The image of the perfect circle and the
child's first attempt to draw, used by Lewis in The
Problem of Pain, is given a human face in The Four
Loves.
We were made for God. Only by being in some respect like
Him, only by being a manifestation of His beauty, loving
kindness, wisdom, or goodness, has any earthly Beloved excited our love. It is not that we have loved them too much,
but that we did not quite understand what we were loving.
It is not that we shall be asked to turn from them, so dearly
familiar, to a Stranger. When we see the face of God we shall
know that we have always known it.

First, though, we ourselves must get a human face.
Lewis' most haunting depiction of the movement toward God is in Till We Have Faces. Orual, overcome by
the cruelty of the gods who seem to take from us all
whom we love, writes her book and makes her case
against the gods. Our misery, she writes, is that there
should be gods at all, for there's not room in the same
world for them and us. (Notice that this is simply a
powerful way of phrasing what Beversluis regards as
the "orthodox Christian" view: that God and human
beings do not share a common moral world.) But the
gods have the last word, and good for Orual that they
do. She comes-most painfully-to learn that the
problem lay in the possessive quality of her loves. Because her loves were swollen and bloated, because she
was struggling to live independently and fashion life
solely according to her own conception of goodness,
the process of transformation could only be painful.
She could not come to know the gods and see their
beauty fully until she herself, having given up the falsifying illusion of independence, was truly able to see.
"How can they meet us face to face till we have faces?"
Orual has been stripped naked before the gods, the
carefully crafted speech that had lain at the center of
her soul for years has been revealed for the sham it
is, when she finally meets the god. And then, nothing
remains to be said.
I ended my first book with the words no answer. I know now,
Lord, why you utter no answer. You are yourself the answer.
Before your face questions die away. What other answer
would suffice? Only words, words; to be led out to battle
against other words.

One might picture this as Beversluis' Ockhamist
capitulating before God, but it would be an insensitive
reader indeed who ended Till We Have Faces thinking
that. Sacrifice indeed-that Orual must make. But she
sees that the god is beautiful though dreadful, and she
sees that she too has become beautiful. She has be13

come, that is, what she had always wanted to beevery bit as much a fruition of her desire as the perfect circle completes the child's first attempt at drawing. Her knowledge of the gods has been deepened
and transformed until she sees what readers of Narnia
learn about the great lion Asian: that though he's no
tame lion and could hardly be called safe, he is good.
If any reader of The Four Loves and Till We Have
Faces is still able to believe that a crucial shift in Lewis'
thinking takes place at the midpoint of A Grief Observed
... well, we must consign such a reader to Beversluis.
Powerful as it is, A Grief Observed continues and develops the line of thought already set forth decades earlier in The Problem of Pain: only because we believe on
other grounds in a good God does pain seem such a
problem. A good God, who is more than a kindly fellow and who truly desires for us the fulfillment of our
nature, will be neither tame nor safe. But the process
of coming to know that God ever more fully, if we
persevere on our journey even in the face of great
temptation to lose heart, will find its completion when
we see the face on which we have always longed to
look-not the face of a stranger but the face which we
ourselves know to be both good and beautiful. Even
then, though, a face terrible in its goodness. For, as
Lewis wrote more than a decade before Asian came
bounding into the Narnia stories,
I think the lion, when he has ceased to be dangerous, will still
be awful: indeed, that we shall then first see that of which the
present fangs and claws are a clumsy, and satanically perverted, imitation. There will still be something like the shaking of a golden mane: and often the good Duke will say, "Let
him roar again."

To set the Christian life into the context of a journey
toward a Goodness that is alien yet recognizable as
good is to be relieved of Beversluis' false dilemma between Platonist and Ockhamist.
But it is not, of course, to be relieved of the perils
of the journey itself. Throughout, the struggle to offer
in concert both mind and heart to God will be just
that-a struggle. And despite the weaknesses, inadequacies, even faults in Lewis' writings and person,
those who come to the writings for guidance along the
way will not, I think, be seriously misled and will often
be helped immeasurably. The truth about the journey,
and the truth about the relation of mind and heart in
the Christian life, must finally be lived. Lewis' own formulation suggests as much: "In relation to the
philosophical premises, a Christian's faith is of course
excessive: in relation to what is sometimes shown him,
it is perhaps just as often defective." That was written
by a man who believed what the children in Narnia
learn about Asian: that the longer you know him the
Cl
bigger he gets.
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Stone

by Log by Tree

It's like winter out of season
As I journey down to the creek side,
The way stiff with weeds
And the tree branches
Stubborn cobwebs on my arms and face.
Along this path violets used to grow
In twos and threes or soft circles,
And I'd gather them, tiny stems at the stalks,
Until my hands were all flowers.
When I drove into town today
How surprised I was
To find the way everything had narrowed, blearedA mere smudge of the town I remembered.
It was as if all the buildings
Had grown quiet and withdrawn.
I found the road to the house quicker,
The driveway shorter.
The house itself seemed too cramped
For all the things I'd planned there,
Each room small and strange in shadow,
Its ghosts gone.
Down here my song had been
Stone by log by tree.
It had been like breathing.
I'd say it as I gathered a sprawl
Of gooseberries from its bent over the path.
Sometimes I'd sit underneath
The mulberry tree at the wood's opening,
Its headdress dotting and purpling the shade.
Now the stretch of green over the bank
I used to think of as the world
Is amazingly near.
In this sad, cold air
The loud buzz of workers
Unraveling new houses on its edge
Is plain and dissonant,
Spoiling the quiet green.
By the creek side where I used to lie
I find bark falling off the trees in chunks
Soft and settled with ants
And the clearing that had always come
Stone by log by tree
Thick with weeds.
If only I could find some violet-colored things
And bury my head in them.

Kim Bridgford
The Cresset

David Paul Nord

THE EDIFICE OF ACADEME
A Meditation on Research, Teaching, and Service

(Editor's Note: Readers of The Cresset may by now
find themselves surfeited by articles on academic life. We urge
them, however, not to turn away from Mr. Nord's pathbreaking essay on the assumption that it involves just another gloss
on the academic vocation. Careful readers will, we are sure,
be stimulated and rewarded by the philosophical subtlety and
analytical rigor of Mr. Nord's meditation. Having read this
article, they will never be able to think about academic life
in quite the same way again.)

Ancient thinkers supposed the world to be composed of four fundamental elements. We in the modern academy know better. There are only three: research, teaching, and service. All human action and
the fruits thereof can be defined by these three basic
elements. This is the natural law by which we live.
But might it be possible that this tripartite division
of academic action is actually not natural law at all, but
is rather a kind of Kuhnian paradigm, a brilliant but
perhaps fallible social construct? I have given that
question a great deal of thought over the past year,
and I'm obliged by professional duty to report that for
a while I thought I had discerned a crack in the
edifice of academic orthodoxy. How I discovered this
philosophical crack and what I did about it is a complicated story, closely associated with my efforts to produce something called a "Tenure Dossier" and with it
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a document called a "Personal Statement." I hasten to
add at this point for the philosophically faint-at-heart
that this is a story with a happy ending. The edifice
is not in danger of collapse, and in fact the very production of this article may well have been the salvation
of it. How can that be, you ask. Well, here's my story.

Academics know that all human activity
can be defined by three elementsresearch, teaching, and service.
Last fall it was given to me to "go up" for tenure at
Indiana University. Prior to that time, I had had no
difficulty working within the paradigmatic world of research, teaching, and service. In this world, as I had
come to understand it, everything was perfectly clear
and quintessentially well ordered. Some things were
research, some were teaching, some were service. In
fact, in the last year or so I had become something of
an expert on the subject, or at least a bit of a buff. For
after-dinner amusement, I would ask people to name
the most bizarre, obscure, or complex activity they had
ever heard of at a university, and then I would instantly classify it (correctly, of course) as research,
teaching, or service. I had, in short, developed the
academic/bureaucratic equivalent of perfect pitch.
With this in mind, I expected that the preparation
of the Tenure Dossier would be a very simple and
routine exercise. As I began to gather together material to stuff into file folders, I knew instinctively that
I would need only three different colors of file folder
labels. Each folder would be numbered; each would
fall under one of the three prefix codes: R, T, and S.
Given my proclivity for academic taxonomy, the placement of books, book chapters, articles, papers,
abstracts, proposals, reviews, summaries, elaborations,
letters, memos, documents, syllabuses, handouts, notes,
votes, statements, evaluations, comments, observations,
reports, indexes, lists, maps, and Christmas cards was
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easy.
But then, as I was wntmg the Personal Statement,
I had a disquieting thought. (The Personal Statement
is a kind of intellectual autobiography that goes at the
beginning of the Tenure Dossier.) If everything is research, teaching, or service, what was the Personal
Statement? It was clearly a "paper" of some sort, but
it seemed to be neither research nor teaching nor service. The three parts of the Personal Statement were
about research, teaching, and service, but no part
seemed to be the thing itself. Yet there I was doing it.
There I was writing something that was not research,
not teaching, not service. My mind reeled. Had I come
upon something genuinely new? Was this indeed a
previously undiscovered academic quark? Realizing the
explosive potential of such a discovery, I resolved to
keep it secret until I had done my best to explore it
and to resolve its mystery through the application of
academic normal science and bureaucratic conventional wisdom. I began the search for epicycles.
My first step in trying to understand the phenomenon was to apply conventional nomenclature. I had
learned in my years in academe that this is often a
convenient way to force-fit new phenomena into old,
time-tested categories. Clearly, I postulated, what I was
dealing with here was metaresearch, metateaching,
and metaservice. Just hearing the sounds of the words
and seeing their division into three familiar categories
eased my mind quite a lot. But I was even more relieved as I began my analysis, because I knew that I
had dealt with something like metaresearch before. I
had written a chapter about historical research for a
textbook on mass communication research. It wasn't
research itself; it was merely about research. This piece
was easily classified in the Dossier as teaching. Therefore, it seemed perfectly logical and safe to generalize:
Metaresearch is teaching. Similarly, I had once given
a convention paper on teaching methods, and that was
easily classified as professional service. Therefore, I
was able further to generalize: Metateaching is service.
I breathed a sigh of relief. Two-thirds of the mystery
was solved. Both metaresearch and metateaching could
be subsumed under the conventional categories teaching and service. (More intriguingly, I realized that I
may have discerned heretofore unexplored links
among the three elements. More on that later.)
But what about metaservice? If metaresearch is
teaching, and metateaching is service, what is metaservice? Naturally, my first instinct was to hypothesize
that metaservice must be research. Philosophical symmetry and scientific parsimony would seem to demand
it. If the system were to remain closed and symmetrical (i.e. , beautiful), it must be reflexive and turn back
on itself in fugue-like fashion. But, try as I might, I
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could not demonstrate, either logically or experimentally, that writing about service (metaservice) was research . This was the conceptual chasm I could not
cross. Metaservice indeed seemed to be that thing in
academe that we all fear most: something genuinely
new.

If metametaservice is service ,
metaservice must be service as well,
for without the latter the former
could not exist. But does
metametaservice exist in fact or
might it be merely a figment of my
own fevered imagination?
But wait! If writing about service in the Personal
Statement was metaservice, I reasoned, what would
happen if I were to write about the writing about service? That is, could there exist metametaservice, and if
so what would it be? It seemed possible that
metametaservice might be a species of service itself.
Clearly this did not seem to be the case with mere
metaservice, for surely there could be no value (service) to anyone in reading about someone else's service. But there might be value (service) in reading
what someone else has written about writing about service (metametaservice), because writing about service
(metaservice) is something every academic must at
some point do. And, ipso facto, if metametaservice is
service, metaservice must be service as well, for without the latter the former could not exist. But does
metametaservice exist in fact, or might it be merely a
figment of my own fevered imagination?
I didn't know the answer to that question , but I
knew what I had to do. I knew that I had a professional duty to report my findings to my colleagues in
the academy-though the heavens should fall in the
process. So I began-sadly, reluctantly, but professionally-to write this article. And then, in a flash of brilliant light, the scales fell from my eyes. In writing this
very article, I was in fact performing metametaservice.
The article was about metaservice, so it was itself
metametaservice. Thus, metametaservice was not a
mere imagining; it actually could exist and did exist in
the true material world of academe-on a piece of
paper. In other words, at that very moment, I was demonstrating experimentally that metametaservice did
exist. Moreover, I had already determined logically
that if metametaservice did exist it would be service,
and that metaservice is a component of metametaservice. Therefore, metaservice is service as well! My
The Cresset

gloom vanished. Far from destroying the elemental
~ara?igm of research, teaching, and service, my investigation had, through its very existence, confirmed it.
In short, upon this article, the academic edifice would
stand!

The Poet Asks for a Raise
(for Dean Dave Schramm)

How many assistant professors can say
that it has been given to them to
save academe from conceptual
catastrophe? Few, I would surmise.
But what next? For me, probably
nothing. Now that I'm tenured, I plan
never to think of such things again.
Of course, this whole experience has been the
apogee of my professional life. How many assistant
professors can say that it has been given to them to
save academe from conceptual catastrophe? Few, I
~ould surmise. But what next? For me, probably nothmg. Because my tenure case was approved, I plan
never to think of such things again. In the post-tenure
twilight ?f my career, memories must suffice. For myself, I will always remain humbly grateful to have had
the honor of demonstrating the unity of metaresearch
and teaching, and metateaching and service. I am also
proud of my role in the elaboration of the theory of
metametaservice. But for those who follow, there is
much work still to be done. While my theories are useful (i.e., heuristically fertile and paradigmatically
strategic), I do not believe that they represent the end
of theory in this area. For example, I leave to minds
more agile and untenured than mine the exploration
of metametaresearch and metametateaching.
Yet it is beyond these obvious areas for further
study that the real opportunities lie. I believe in the
marrow of my bones that one day human-kind will develop a unified field theory of academic action : One
day research, teaching, and service will be shown to be
aspects of a single, fundamental force. I believe that
my own investigations into academic metatheory
clearly suggest that there exists a unity of research and
teaching (the strong force). Further, I am convinced
t~at service (the weak force) will also one day be
hoked to the strong force , and that this link will be established through the metaservice-research connection
t~at my theo~y has predicted. While none of us may
hve to see this glorious day, I think we can all agree
that the establishment of this link is crucial for the future of academic action, for only this will produce the
sort of closed, circular, simplistic system that we
academics can umierstand.
••

Metaphors balanced on my lap,
I wait for speech.
The dim light stripes your desk
where dot charts and AAUP graphs
are arranged like new linen.
We worry over form and the liturgy
of dissent,
agree on Lorrie's coffee,
and settle in silence,
rehearsing litanies of yes and no
in rhythms of private agonies
or moments of glad grace.
The Basque shepherd has set up his trailer
on the hill across the road.
The sheep draw us out,
and we eagerly chart their brown waves
up the burnt hills where they browse
in sage and mesquite.
The poplars below the bluff
stand in shadow,
and in our mind's eye we see the sun
slide into the blue Pacific
sending long fingers of mist
up the barrancas.
Our collection of words and dreams
jingle in our minds like old coins
and fall like bells from the dark rocks
where the sheep move easily,
their small mouths moving
over the wet grass.
And in the dark office
we do not move or talk,
the pulse of your cigarette counterpoint
to the pale magenta of the bougainvillea
that rustles against the cooling glass.

J. T. Ledbetter

••
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Jill Baumgaertner

MY LIFE ON THE FRINGE
A Report from the Lutheran-Evangelical Frontier

Recently, I received a letter from an irate reader
whose poem The Cresset had not accepted for publication. Among other things, this individual asked indignantly, "Who are you?" implying a final "anyway." For
the first time I realized that my ties to Valparaiso University, although I feel them strongly, might not be remembered by the majority of Cresset readers. Time
also has a way of blurring connections between faces
and names, as I am reminded each time I grope for
the name of a former student who has plopped herself
down in my office, eager to tell me of her new life
beyond the B.A .
It has been eleven years since my husband and I left
Valparaiso. At that time we could still pack all of our
belongings into a small U-Haul truck and our children
into car seats. His law degree was brand new. My final
graduate degree was still six years away. Now, to our
utter amazement (and, I'm sure, to the amazement of
students who remember our children toddling around
the Alumni Hall director's apartment in the early 70s),
we find ourselves the parents of teenagers, one of
whom is looking at prospective colleges this year.
Friends often assume that I graduated from Valpo,
but Valpo never awarded me any degrees-nor did I
ever attend classes as a student. I was, however, hired
in 1969 at a tender age and with a fresh M.A. to teach
in the English Department. I will be forever grateful
to Paul Phipps for taking such a scandalous chance
with me, for I know that I probably received much
more than I was able to give in those first difficult but
rewarding years of teaching. During that time I
realized that teaching was indeed my calling and that
in order to continue, I needed to pursue a doctorate
in my field. So in many significant ways I feel that I
did graduate from Valparaiso University.

Jill Baumgaertner teaches English at Wheaton College. She
serves The Cresset as Poetry Editor and as a reviewer of
contemporary fiction.
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Some of my friends at Valpo and in my congregation, Grace Lutheran Church in River Forest, have
been politely curious about my current academic affiliation with Wheaton College, an evangelical school
where my present responsibilities include teaching the
creative writing, poetry writing, and fiction writing
courses. The other Lutheran on the faculty is a
member of the Art Department and we frequently
find ourselves assigned to the same committees. We
joke sometimes that it is because the college feels more
comfortable knowing that we are both in the same
place at the same time, but actually, it is simply efficient to have us there together. Between the two of us
we fill the roles of token artist, token woman, token
poet, and token Democrat-and we also represent the
entire membership of the Lutheran caucus, which so
far has not been too strident, but, well, you know Lutherans. Anything could happen.

Some of my Lutheran friends have been
politely curious about my current
academic affiliation with Wheaton
College, an evangelical institution.
My Lutheran affiliation has pushed me into some
peculiar situations at Wheaton. I was recently asked to
plan a Reformation service to take place during chapel
sometime this fall, but I was instructed not to include
a message. I think that means that the organizer
wanted to expose the students to liturgical worship
without taking time for a homily, but it does make me
wonder if he understands what the Reformation was
all about. I am concerned about the nature of worship
at Wheaton. Sometimes chapel content seems a bit
thin, but-and this is important-! am not the only
one at Wheaton talking about this. There is a concerted effort among many individuals to improve the
quality of worship, and because there is a school chaplain, but no chapel hierarchy, change will probaThe Cresset

bly be easier at Wheaton than at an institution with a
more bureaucratic setup. Under the circumstances that
now exist at Wheaton, the innovators often come from
the most surprising places. During Holy Week this
past year, for example, I attended one of the most
profoundly moving services I have ever experienced,
sponsored not by the Department of Religion or the
chaplain's office, but by the Department of Biology.
These services take place in auditoriums or lecture
halls and I must admit that I do often yearn for the
beauty of the Chapel of the Resurrection. There is no
doubt about it. The spirit is uplifted by the presence
of sacred space.

I discovered that Wheaton students
are, like my students at Valparaiso,
hardworking, earnest, intelligent
young men and women. The difference
is that, like the faculty, all
Wheaton students must be Christian
in order to be admitted.
I was not sure at first about my place at Wheaton,
or if I would be interested in staying beyond the year
for which I was initially hired. I was skeptical about,
among other things, the statement of responsibility
which all faculty and students must sign, pledging to
abstain from smoking and drinking. It sounded suspiciously legalistic. But I was impressed with what I saw
happening in the English Department and with the
college-wide commitment to the integration of faith
and learning. It seemed to me that Wheaton was taking very seriously its Christian base-at the same time
being careful to avoid the pitfalls into which fundamentalist schools like Bob Jones University have fallen. As for the rules-they still seem legalistic to me,
but I also understand that they encourage a disciplined lifestyle which is a part of Wheaton's cultural
heritage.
I discovered that Wheaton students are, like my students at Valparaiso, hardworking, earnest, intelligent
young men and women. The difference is that, like
the faculty, all Wheaton students must be Christian in
order to be admitted. (Faculty members must even
participate in a faith and learning seminar before
being considered for tenure, and write a paper on the
relationship of one's faith to one's discipline.) Occasionally, I have found the homogeneity overwhelming
and at those times I am grateful for my forty-mile
daily commute to and from my home in Oak Park.
But, contrary to popular belief about what goes on at
October, 1985

evangelical schools, I have also found freedom atWheaton to teach what I want in the way I feel best.
I do not indoctrinate my students, but I want them
to think seriously about what the Word made flesh
means to them in their poetry and their fiction. I want
them to avoid imposing meaning artificially. I want
them to forget about preconceived Christian "formulae" and write what they see, hear, smell, touch,
and taste. This is difficult for many Christian students,
who feel a responsibility to use their talents to the
glory of God but who have not yet learned that the
"meaning" is already in them. They do not have to
plaster it over a poem, or add a neat moral to a story,
or manipulate characters within a stultifying plot diagram. Students who have embraced the gospel know
instinctively what transformation means. They understand the thin line between comedy and tragedy. They
bring with them a knowledge of story from their scriptural studies and this enriches their own efforts immeasurably. But they still often doubt the power of
their faith to inform all of their actions-both conscious and unconscious. They do not fully believe that
the image, the character, the metaphor, the story itself
will contain, without abstraction, the theology.
This is difficult for us to understand-no matter
what our faith tradition. We are so afraid that our
doubts and weaknesses will be revealed-and somehow
the message both Lutherans and evangelicals have
given their young people is that to doubt is to commit

On Second Thought
From Smithson's ceiling Foucault's pendulum
unsteadies us who walk in liquid air
around the steel cable, barely noting
motion, holding hands in case some fey
waywardness belies earth's gravity
and we fall up or down.
On second thought
let go. Let's see just what solidifies,
what sets when what we know veers off, disintegrates, remasses on some shore
we've never seen.
We wait
the steady state of our reserve, when our
true selves around true North converge.

Martha M. Vertreace
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the unpardonable sin. We have forgotten Luther's raging doubts . We have forgotten Christ's doubt as He
hung on the cross and cried, "Father, why have you
forsaken me?" We have unwittingly given our fellow
believers a destructive message: the doubter is the person whose faith will finally die.
My husband's father, a Missouri Synod pastor, once
asked in a sermon: "How much faith do you need to
be a Christian? A mountain's worth? No, all you need
is a fingertip 's worth." He was not saying that we
should be content with that fingertip; he was saying
that God will take us as we are-doubts and all. And
for all of us who live in the century of doubt, these
are lifesaving words.

We make doubt the unpardonable sin.
We have forgotten Luther's raging
doubts. We have forgotten Christ's
doubt as He hung on the cross. We
have given our fellow believers the
destructive message that the doubter
is the person whose faith will die.
The doubts are sure to come and we need to teach
our young people how to live with them. What I have
seen happen to young Christians at both Wheaton and
at Valparaiso is that, confronted with the truth about
themselves-that they are doubters, that they have
been doubters all of their lives, but have up to the
time of crisis ignored their small everyday doubts or
attempted to contain them with cliched explanationsconfronted with this truth, they look back on their
lives, recognize the doubts they have always had , conclude they have been living a lie, and throw away their
faith as a sham. This is the great failing of Christian
education-and perhaps it is the very nature of the
Christian educational institution that makes this problem so universal. We have-even at Wheaton, where
the integration of faith and learning is a living concern-even at Valparaiso, where the chapel is the
center of the campus-tended to compartmentalize
our religion. What happens on Saturday night and
then on Sunday morning seem sometimes to belong to
two separate categories of experience. In these settings
the tendency to hold faith up as its own type of good
work is a grave temptation.
I hope for my son and daughter, as they watch so
many of their parochial school friends drift away from
the faith , that they will also be able to bring forth
from their Christian education a few "fragments to
shore up against their ruin." I would like to believe
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that their parents, their school, and their church have
helped, not hindered them in this process-that we
have dealt with them directly and honestly, that we
have not given them cliches when they have asked
questions of life and death.
As for the answer to the question-Who are you
anyway?-I guess I have to say I am a doubter and a
believer-and one who is hopeful that the Word made
flesh can inform my own words and those of my students. I am a Lutheran who, much to my surprise, has
found a place in the evangelical world , and an
evangelical who communes in the Lutheran church I
love. I am also, I must confess, one who still stumbles
at the evangelical version of "A Mighty Fortress." Did
you know "theirs" was different both in text and setting? Don't tell my Wheaton colleagues, but I sure like
"our" version better.
Cl

Travelling by Night
The full moon hangs in a spring sky
Loose above the road I travel
In the shadow of the hills
Of water, sand, and snow.
I remember streams and fish.
The moon in its Four Phases
Hangs on a calendar nailed to my wall,
Where each day's fish lies in the belly of the moon,
Symbols to indicate prime time
For d ying on my angler's hook
In swift and never-failing streams.
I sleep and travel deep into the night.
Across the Darkest Phases of the moon
I see a man sink in the belly of a fish
Dying for three days in its watery flesh.
Fish rises from the murk of the abyss
And spews its blessed water
On craters of the earth.
I dream the dying of the moon,
See symbols on my calendar
Turn into hanging fish, celestial catch,
An ICHTHYS in the lightening heavens
Above my darkened road .

Charlotte F. Otten
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Linda C. Ferguson

MUSIC AS A LIBERAL ART
Reflections on Music Education

Were music taught today in the terms of the
medieval quadrivium (arithmetic, music, geometry,
and astronomy) , it would be, as a subject, unrecognizable to most liberal arts students as well as to most
musicians. The liberal study of music, the science of
relative multitudes, dealt with the nature of the
phenomenon rather than its particularized manifestations: that which was speculated upon rather than
heard. 1
Is it possible that music as traditionally understood
among the quadrivial sciences is something completely
other than music as it figures in contemporary culture? It would seem so; and yet vestiges of the liberal
understanding of music linger in everyday life. The
liberal tradition, as distinct from the practical or professional tradition, suggests that music, as a discipline
and human endeavor, must be dealt with in a serious
way. The liberal tradition is responsible for our view
that making music is distinguished from utilitarian
handicrafts such as quilting and carpentry, and from
recreational and athletic skills such as gymnastics and
swimming. The liberal tradition is responsible for the
inclusion of music courses and degrees in academia,
for the generally accepted opinion that it is good for
children to take piano lessons, for the recurrent belief
that certain forms of popular music are detrimental to
the moral fibre of the young, and for the common
practice of employing music in worship and on solemn
public occasions. Most educated (and many un-educated)
persons operate on the assumption that music is a
"good," whether or not they claim to understand anything about it. This assumption, too, is grounded in
liberal thinking. In these and other common practices
and assumptions, we affirm Plato's belief that humankind is endowed by the Muses with harmony, not only

Linda C. Ferguson teaches in the Department of Music at
Valparaiso University and writes regularly for The Cresset
on musical matters.
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"with a view to irrational pleasure," 2 but for somehigher purpose as well, within the realm of intelligibility and towards some end that ultimately relates to
goodness.
But do these vestiges represent a coherent and integrated understanding of music in the life of the mind
and spirit, or are they merely left-over empty customs
which will be discarded as soon as they are consciously
examined? I propose that there is still a connection between music as a liberal art and music as a fine art
which can find practical application in education. And
I will hypothesize that a key to understanding the
relationship between music as it is speculated upon
and music as it is heard can be found through
considering the connection between the musical
composition and the musical performance. It
should be emphasized that I am not claiming that musical composition is a liberal art while musical performance is a fine art. Rather, I suggest that music's dual
nature in education bears analogy to the relationship
between the musical composition and the musical performance. This basic problem of musical aesthetics can
help define and illuminate the nature of music's split
personality.
In an essay which appeared earlier in these pages
("The LP Generation and Me," September, 1984), I
observed that any serious effort to determine music's
essential nature is almost immediately beset with the
necessity of some attention to the distinctive processes
and products of the composer and of the performer.
I would claim, further, that the composer-performer
tension has been especially problematic for those aestheticians who are eager to make all arts fulfill the
same conditions. The simple process/product account1

Justification for the inclusion of music in the traditional system
of liberal arts, as well as the rationales supporting variant positionings of music among the quadrivial sciences, is discussed
by Edward A. Lippman, "The Place of Music in the System of
Liberal Arts," in Aspects of Medieval and Renaissance Music: A
Birthday Offering to Gustav Reese, ed. LaRue (New York: Norton,
1966), pp. 545-559.
2
Piato Timaeus (trans. Jowett) 47d.
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ing will not dismiss the duality, since, to condense the
argument from the earlier essay, both composer and
performer can claim to be artists, each engaging in a
process which results in a product: the product of the
composer being purely conceptual, in contrast to the
audible product of the performer.
Let us accept as useful Leonard Meyer's explanation
that a performance at once "actualizes and particularizes the potential information contained in the
score." 3 And let us further accept Hilde Hein's definition of performance as "an aesthetic phenomenon of
primary [not merely secondary, or derivative] significance," characterized by dynamism and process, with
change (or "becoming") as its fundamental value. 4

To study music liberally is to aspire
to accomplishment beyond technical
proficiency or mastery of specialized
information. Liberality entails
reflection; it encourages the ability
not only to do but to think clearly
about what one does and why.
Edward Lippman defines the musical composition,
on the other hand, as "a nonaudible entity that exists
only as an object of intention," and, further, that "ontologically the musical work is a conceptual object; it
is not an aesthetic object in a literal sense but in the
extended sense of its meaning and implication, its associated imagery and sonorous realization. The work is
quite distinct from any of its performances and from
the totality of them." 5 Let us adopt Lippman's definition of the musical work as conceptual object and let
it serve to represent the abstract and general concept,
"Music." The conceptual existence of Music (as distinct
from "works of music") can be understood as analogous to the ontological status of the composition. And
as the composition is "quite distinct from any of its
performances -and from the totality of them," so is
"Music," in the abstract and liberal sense, distinct from
any of its works and "from the totality of them."
Again, to extend the argument begun in my essay
on recorded music, cited earlier, we must recognize
that the composition's existence transcends both
printed score and audible performance. It is not "used
3

Leonard Meyer, "On Re-hearing Music," in Music, the Arts, and
Ideas (University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 48.
Hilde Hein, "Performance as an Aesthetic Category," journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 28 (1970) : 382, 384.
5
Edward A. Lippman, A Humanistic Philosophy of Music (New
York University Press, 1977), pp. 49, 238-39 .
4
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up" by repeated realizations, not consumed by "definitive performances" nor deteriorated by inept ones.
Performances particularize and concretize the abstract
ideal of the composition, as works of music particularize and make sensible the ideal of Music. In the
relationship between composition and performance,
then, lies a key for maintaining music's liberal and
general integrity, while allowing us to ground our
study of it in sound.
To study music liberally is to aspire to accomplishment beyond technical proficiency or mastery of specialized information. Liberality entails reflection and
self-consciousness; it encourages the ability not only to
do but to think clearly about what one does and why
one does it. In purely sonic phenomena, the liberal
tradition dictates that, ultimately, we seek meaning.
But proposing to students that we study music liberally
by contemplating meaning is an invitation to contrive
fanciful literary and pictorial images. And while there
is nothing necessarily wrong with such constructions,
too often they allow the student to delude himself into
believing that his inventions truly explain the content
of the musical work which allegedly provoked them.
Something has gone awry.
To understand music in the liberal sense is to reflect
upon its meaning, upon the kinds of meanings it can
reasonably be claimed to carry, upon its connections
with other human expressions and endeavors, upon its
relationship to ideas larger han its own systems. In
short, the liberal study of music must be conducted in
the terms of philosophy rather than of a diluted
musicology. And the terms of philosophy seem far removed from students who obligingly concoct
screenplays to accompany the "soundtracks" of Mozart
and Brahms symphonies they are assigned to hear. In
trying to move from music as a liberal discipline to
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music as a sonorous experience, we have neglected, in
our collective thinking and in our teaching, to distinguish between Music (as philosophy construes it) and
works of music (as they are manifest in musical practice). Similarly, we are frequently careless in failing to
distinguish between the separate processes and products of composer and performer, when we speak ambiguously of "music" and of "musicians."
In order to be true to our liberal inclinations, beginnings must follow from the idea of Music as a general
phenomenon of which works of music are concrete
particularizations. To do so will result in more defensible conjectures about musical meaning. In order to
discover the specific significance of particular works of
music, we might seek to discern how that work is distinct from others of its kind. But to establish categories
of meaning, we must seek the essence which all works
of music share. The liberal study of music, then, begins with an inquiry into the nature of music, and it
continues with the "why" rather than the "how."
But music as experienced is not abstract and
speculative. Rather it is concrete and particular, even
that music we conventionally call abstract. The study
of "Music" can proceed only for a very short time
without reference to musical examples, to concrete
music sounds (i.e. "works of music") . And so, in modern times, a well-justified shift in emphasis from the
abstract to the sonorous experience of music has resulted in courses for the lay person known loosely as
"general music" and taught by specialists in musical
practice. True generality, however, has given way to a
highly fragmented set of approaches to musical appreciation. Analyses, provision of socio-historical background, biographical study of composers, concern for
identification of stylistic periods and specific works,
and emphasis on score-reading have, for purposes of
these courses, become the apparent means to musical
comprehension. Works of music are treated , often in
detail, but Music (as an abstraction) is rarely considered, if at all, and usually only to expedite some practical explanation of rudiments (e.g., how quarter notes
relate to whole notes).
By compartmentalizing the study of music, even for
the non-musician, into the categories of history, formal
and stylistic analysis, ethnic derivation, and social context, the relationship between music as we hear it and
music as our liberal tradition tells us it is becomes increasingly unclear. I am not suggesting that such
categories be disregarded. The problem does not lie in
specialized studies of music, which may serve their
own good purposes, but rather in the delusion which
they promote that knowledge of the beautiful and
meaningful in music comes through the study of any
one fragment. To fragment Music is to explain it, on
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the one hand, as the Pythagoreans did: by claiming
that the mathematical ratios between tones are identical with the basic reality. On the other hand, we diminish not only the value of Music, but ourselves as
well, if we deny it the rational and intelligible dimension.

Rarely do students in music
departments confront the basic
philosophical issues: What is the
nature of musical art? What is
"created"? What are the principles
of creation in this art? What are
its limits, and its possibilities?
The general and abstract principles which underlie
Music and which unify all works of music have not, as
a rule, been the starting point for "General Music"
education; rather, attention has been diverted immediately to very particular aspects of particular compositions-and from the musical sounds to the historical and cultural baggage introduced as "music appreciation." Concern for Music as a liberal art, I have
claimed, results in a study organized in the terms of
aesthetics. But aesthetic inquiry, in academic institutions, usually resides in philosophy departments;
courses in introductory aesthetics are rarely taught by
professors with any rigorous understanding of the
inner working of musical objects, and they fail too
often to take into account the autonomy of musical
art. "If we start by postulating the essential sameness
of the arts," writes Langer, "we shall learn no more
about that sameness. We shall only skip or evade every
problem that seems, offhand, to pertain to one art but
not to some other, because it cannot be really a problem of Art, and so we shall forcibly limit ourselves to
simple generalities that may be safely asserted." 6
Music departments, on the other hand, offer courses
taught by musicians and musicologists which aim at
mastery, either practical or theoretical, of particular
objects of musical art. Rarely do students in music departments confront the basic philosophical issues:
What is the nature of musical art? What is "created"?
What are the principles of creation in this art? What
are its limits, and its possibilities? The lack of apparent
connection between music as liberal art and music as
practiced is reinforced, if not caused, by the failure of
philosophers and musicians to refer to one another. It
6

Susanne K. Langer, "Deceptive Analogies," in Problems of Art
(New York: Scribner's, 1957), p. 78.
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should be obvious that aestheticians need practitioners
of music in order to be supplied with the objects for
their speculations. It has generally been less obvious
that a reciprocal need exists, but I suggest that musicians and music educators do need the work of
philosophers if they are to comprehend the significance of their own work in the larger world of ideas.

How should a truly "general" music
education proceed? It should begin
with the abstractions of the
philosopher, with the what and why of
music, with large questions of value.
How then, should a truly "general" music education
proceed? It should begin with the abstractions of the
philosopher, with the what and the why of Music, with
the large questions of value and meaning. From these
speculative beginnings, the study should move to the
testing ground of sonorous music (i.e., works of
music). Recall the analogy constructed earlier, and
consider that compositions precede performances of
those compositions. Something must be understood
about the work before it makes sense to comment on
particular realizations of that work. Similarly, something general must be understood about Music as an
abstraction before claims about particular works of
music can be valid. But compositions left unperformed
remain virtually unknowable by the layperson. So,
Music contemplated only philosophically, m the
abstract and general sense, is ungraspable.
"General Music," like the composition, is inaudible,
an ideal object of conception and intention, rather
than of concrete embodiment; recognition of its existence makes possible an infinite number of concrete
manifestations (which are dynamic and graspable) and
also unifies and brings coherence to an otherwise unmanageable body of human expressions. Like the musical composition, Music, in the liberal sense, must be
particularized in practice if it is to be experienced, but
it cannot be totally contained or defined in any one
embodiment. But as multiple hearings of a single performance of a composition can reveal the nature of
that composition to an ever more informed listener (as
through repeated hearings of a recorded performance), so can a single work of music provide the listener with greater understanding of what Music is.
And as multiple performances can ever reveal new dimensions and potentialities inherent in a single composition, so can the possibilities of Music be suggested,
but never exhausted, by works of music.
Cl
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Country W inter
though I am gone
I remember how silently leaves
fall in the deep woods
and how the crows sweep
darkly over the hard trees
against the blood sun of autumn
there will be a soft time
of dim light
and obscure dreams
while last stalks from corn rows
send up their rose smoke
then
knowing the year's end
marks their own
the people stop on their walks
to listen in the silver moonlight
and stare down frozen rutted lanes
to bright windows through tangled
branches along the creek
and in a neighboring town
a woman will turn
to the window
rather than speak the words
in the cold rooms
for now they will not speak
of the aching
or the pull of the ground
that draws them down into the earth
to meet something there
half-way
to help it up
that will be later:
some sense of turningan awakening

J. T. Ledbetter
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Labor Day Labor
Richard Lee
The Labor Day sermon came
down in the suburban church I visited, and the preacher called us all
to greater faithfulness at our work.
Most of the familiar ingredients for
such a sermon were present or accounted for--our work at our jobs
was our "calling from God"; our
work at our jobs participated in His
"order of creation"; our work at our
jobs should therefore be done "honestly for honest pay," and finally, by
His grace, the quality of our work
could go "beyond price" and become
our "pardonable pride." In my hearing no one wept or laughed.
The preacher meant well, of
course. But once again The Ancient
of Days was silly puttied into the
shape of a job placement director,
drill sergeant, and pom-pom girl for
the celebration of work. The sermon
almost turned work into very Providence, but an early "Amen," possibly
due to the heat of the day, pulled it
up short of that popular protestant
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idolatry.
I don't want to belabor the earnest preacher's sermon. To preach
on work is to tackle a formidable
task of biblical interpretation, and
I'd rather my preacher try and falter than not try at all. The biblical
view of work is surely tricky--our
work may be blessing or curse; our
work takes its limit but also its beginning in sabbath; our work almost accidentally provides for ourselves while it takes its nearer purpose in relieving the poor; Jesus
perhaps carpenters but mostly wanders itinerantly dependent upon
the work of others, while Paul
boasts that his work of the ministry
is supported by his tentmaking.
And behind all the biblical images
of work from the first Adam to the
last Archangel is "The God Who
Works" almightily in all His creation and redemption for us.
As nettlesome as it must be for
preachers to clear the ground
around the biblical view of work, it
is reasonably clear it has little to do
with that Labor Day sermon. To
begin with, the biblical focus is on
the worker not the work. God's
callings to men and women in the
Bible are almost always away from
their work before they are returned to it, and I suspect His several callings for us today must first
distance us from our jobs. No better
word of God could now be heard
in America where the pressures
mount daily to subordinate all of
our lives to our jobs and serve the
national god of productivity. Certainly biblical preaching need not
echo that work ethic nor claim it
for God until it is cleansed of its
ideology. If the suburban preacher
had looked into his congregation
he might have seen many men and
women-including a nearing
majority of two-income familiesalready overdetermined by their
jobs. He might also have noted
some unemployed for whom his
sermon had nothing to say until

they found work.
The biblical view of our callings
from God is always broader than
our jobs, even broader than our
work outside our jobs, and it is
closely related to the calling of the
Gospel. (A theologian might say
that our work is as much a part of
God's "order of redemption" as it is
part of His "order of creation.")
This means that our callings first
distance us from our work in order
to return us to our work to determine it-rather than let it determme us.
What that determination of our
work means concretely for each job
each layman preaches best to himself or herself, and there is no biblical blueprint for the reformation
of all the conditions of human
labor. In that suburban church,
however, some of the members
held the more privileged jobs in
our society, and I suspect they
would know where to reform their
professions-and possibly the conditions of the work of the workers
they manage. A Labor Day sermon
relieving the faithful but fretful
from their subjection of themselves
to their work (of subjecting others
to their work) might have been welcome to some of the weary and
heavy laden in that congregation.
But that good news depends upon
preaching the God who brings all
things into subjection to Himself
and would have all men and
women bring their work into subjection to themselves.
Which brings me back to the sermon I promised not to belabor.
Perhaps faithfulness at the work of
at least one congregation might
begin by helping its preacher distance himself from his work to determine his work afresh. All our
callings from God begin by putting
His care for the worker before the
worker's carefulness for his work,
and that seems to me good news
for both preacher and people any
Labor Day.
Cl
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A Successful
Return to Oz
Richard Maxwell
The new Walt Disney production
Return to Oz is not drawn exclusively from any one of L. Frank
Baum's stories. The scriptwriters
have combined elements from The
Land of Oz, Ozma of Oz, and probably The Emerald City of Oz. This synthetic approach makes sense. The
Land is often considered Baum's
best book but it contains several
prominent elements which would
not play well in 1985: the elaborate
satire on feminism is dated (though
it is exciting when General Jinjur
and her army of housewives with
knitting needles conquer the
Emerald City); Tip's sex-change
operation into Princess Ozma
would probably seem kinky to present-day audiences, whether children or adults. While the movie retains much of The Land's plot, characters from Ozma (Billina the chicken, Tik-Tok the robot) and the
threat against Oz itself in The
Emerald City fill in what would
otherwise be considerable gaps.
This material yields marvelous
In
one
sequence,
set-pieces.
Dorothy must steal a magic powder
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from a kind of museum gallery
where a sorceress, the Princess
Mombi , displays her spare heads
(culled from beautiful women).
The heads nod on their pedestals
in velvet cases while Dorothy tiptoes past; she reaches a case
fronted with a mirror and opening
it furtively finds herself facing the
sorceress's original head , spiteful
and restless in its slumbers perhaps
because it has been tossed in this
dark corner. As Dorothy grabs the
powder the head awakens and
screams her name at her-and then
the other heads open their eyes
and follow suit, and then we see
(upstairs) Mombi's headless body
rise from its bed, shaking with rage
or fear , it is hard to say which.
There is much more to praise:
the bowlegged walk of Tik-Tok,
perfectly matching his rotund morphology; the midwestern voice of
Billina, who sounds like a Hoosier
aunt of mine (and no doubt like
other people's Hoosier aunts); the
good grace of Dorothy, a young actress quite different from Judy
Garland. So many scenes and details come out well that eventually
the Ozophile viewer becomes a bit
puzzled . Return to Oz has been cobbled together with great competence-but how can it sustain itself
so consistently? A film that was
merely professional wouldn't have
this magic. Somehow a whole has
been made from these diverse
parts.
The film's energy comes from a
positive respect for Baum. There is
also a negative energy at work. No
one could set out to make an Oz
movie and ignore MGM 's 1939
spectacular. In certain ways Return
seems to evade the obvious precedent. It offers no songs and the
characters resemble John Neill's illustrations to the original stories
more than they do Ray Bolger and
company in vaudeville getup.
Nonetheless the second featurelength Oz movie comments im-

plicitly and extensively on the
first.The commentary is worth
study as a skirmish in the history of
film; also (and more importantly)
because it is a means by which the
later work keeps its imaginative integrity.
Since any real American has seen
The Wizard of Oz at least three
times, I need hardly explain the
trick of plot whereby the black-andwhite Kansas characters reappear
as technicolor Oz characters. This
device was invented by Noel
Langley, who wrote four early
drafts of The Wizard. Later, after
Langley had been dismissed from
the project, a new pair of
scriptwriters developed his idea in
a way that he had not anticipated. 1
Oz is a dream version of Kansas?
All right, then. Dorothy's overriding desire throughout her Oz adventures will be to get back to Kansas. She will learn from her adventures in a transfigured version of
that no doubt excellent state that
home is a wonderful place, replete
with marvels and full of love she
had previously overlooked. And
just in case anybody misses the
point, Glinda will prompt our
heroine to state outright her
philosophy of home, immediately
before she returns to Auntie Em
and immediately after too.
The last moments of this sequence are especially noteworthy.
Dorothy wakes up in bed with a
nasty crack on the head and all the
friendly characters of her dream
gathered about her, now in their
Kansas personae. (What about the
witch, bad Margaret Hamilton? Has
1

The story of the scripts, so far as it will
ever be known , is set forth in Aljean
Harmetz's The Making of the Wizard of Oz
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp .
26-59. In Baum's books-where the
dream framework is unthought ofDorothy is able to convince her family
that Oz exists; eventually she invites
them to move there and they do. Baum
is so matter-of-fact about the whole thing
that the concept of doubled worlds never
becomes a dominating concern.

The Cresset

she given up her plan to exterminate Toto? Was she blown away by
the storm? We will never find out.)
As the strains of "There's No Place
Like Home" fade out gently, the
following dialogue ensues. Dorothy:
Oh, Auntie Em, it's you! Auntie Em:
There there, lie quiet now, you've
just had a bad dream. Dorothy: No,
it wasn't a dream. This was a real
truly-live-place-and I remember
that some of it wasn't very nice.
But most of it was beautiful. But
just the same all I kept saying to
everybody was, "I want to go
home"-and they sent me home.
(Nervous laughter from her assembled
auditors.) Doesn't anybody believe
me? But anyway, Toto, we're
home, home-and this is my room
and you're all here and I'm not
going to leave here ever again because I love you all and-oh ,
Auntie Em, there's no place like
home!" 2
To quote Yip Harburg (lyricist
for The Wizard and yet another
tinkerer with its script): "The picture didn't need that 'Home, Sweet
Home,' 'God Bless Our Home'
tripe." 3 I agree with Harburg-and
yet, the offending sequence has its
merits. Its combination of cloying
sweetness with near-hysteria has no
serious rival, unless in the Christmas stories of Charles Dickens.
Something urgent is being communicated
here,
though
the
medium is less the words than it is
the histrionics of Judy Garland.
This Dorothy is eager but unable to
convey the reality of her experience. No one will ever believe her,
a fact she appears to realize already. She is doomed to a life with
people who love her and humor
her. They will always tap their
heads a little when Dorothy starts
talking about Oz. What then can
2

1 quote from a phonograph record
which gives an abridged version of the
dialogue, so there may be some lines
missing here.
3
Harmetz, p. 57
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our unfortunate heroine do but
blather on about staying home
forever with Auntie Em?
Return to Oz begins with another
prelude in Kansas, this time a more
elaborate one. Uncle Henry can't
seem to get the house rebuilt, even
though winter is rapidly coming
on, and Dorothy keeps babbling
about scarecrows. Auntie Em is fed
up with them both. She takes the
little girl to a neighboring town for
a course of electroshock therapy
guaranteed to eliminate Oz from
Dorothy's mind. While the doctor
makes his pitch, Dorothy spots
another little girl, more conventionally pretty than she, who pops up
behind a window and then disappears. Later the same girl helps
Dorothy escape just before the
shock treatment is to begin. They
rush out into a bad storm, followed
by the horrible Nurse Wilson.
Dorothy's new friend drowns (it is
implied) in a swollen river while
Dorothy herself manages to sail
downstream in a chicken coop. She
wakes up the next morning
stranded on the edge of Oz with a
miraculously articulate Billina.

Home is not a comfortable place, despite the
pieties of MGM.
None of this is very lighthearted. There is an edge of
whimsy in some of the proceedings
(e.g. , Dorothy soliloquizing to Billina in the farmyard , shortly before
she is taken off to the doctor) but
the comic tonality of The Wizard's
prelude is replaced by a pervasive
melancholy. Home is not a comfortable place, despite the pieties of
MGM. Kansas and Oz are not so
much parallel as they are antithetical worlds. To put the point
another way, Dorothy has to choose
one or the other but can't have
both without everybody coming

down on her. The problem is underlined by the absence of Ray
Bolger, Frank Haley, and Bert
Lahr-that is, of the characters
who lived on the farm but also had
Oz identities. Not one of these doubled characters has reappeared so
far in The Return. And even though
the crackpot doctor may remind us
of Frank Morgan/Professor Marvel,
his function is to suppress imagination, not stimulate it. If home once
had some Ozish elements, it doesn't
anymore.
The Wizard is about Dorothy's return to Kansas (so, at least, its concluding scene insists); the new film
is about her Return to Oz and her
subsequent attempt to restore that
elusive kingdom before she must
leave it once again. As Dorothy
soon discovers, Oz has fallen to a
mysterious enemy. The Yellow
Brick Road looks like the Dan Ryan
expressway after a hard winterexcept that there's no one to be victimized by the potholes. The
Emerald City is in ruins, and all of
Dorothy's companions have become
statues. The petrified city recalls an
unusually perverse Mannerist garden. Signs of life are frozen and
distanced: the only "living" creatures are mechanical or semimechanical (the friendly Tik-Tok,
the hostile Wheelers). The conqueror of Oz is the Gnome King, a
monarch of the subterranean mineral world who doubles for the
crackpot doctor. The king and the
doctor have in common an ability
to preserve the form but eliminate
the motivating principle of life.
The Gnome King's assistant in this
endeavor is the above-mentioned
Princess Mombi, a double for
Nurse Wilson; if he assimilates everything to his own stony substance, she has her own methods
for turning other people into herself.
Dorothy has to risk becoming an
ornament of the Gnome King or a
head of the Princess Mombi; she

27

triumphs over both these compulsive collectors by using the Powder
of Life, which animates the inanimate, and by respecting the independent existence of characters
created to be servants or slaves
(Jack Pumpkinhead, Tik-Tok). Her
adventures survived, she can locate
the Princess Ozma, who has been
under an enchantment. Ozma
turns out to be the girl who
drowned in the river at the film's
beginning. Ozma is a doubled character, one of whose incarnations is
cut off by death. Her fate is not
exactly like going to Heaven. She
has had her existence in two realms
all along, neither of them especially
other-worldly. She continues to live
in Oz while ceasing to exist in Kansas. She becomes-as the film
makes clear by its use of mirrors
and of visual compositions-the Oz
side of Dorothy Gale herself.
The last scene of Return expands
on Dorothy's relation with Ozma.
She can see the Princess in her
bedroom mirror (the house has
been completed by Uncle Henry,
who came out of his funk for
reasons
not
explained).
Our
heroine smiles at the image of
Ozma-but does so privately. Like
Mombi, she has come to live her
most intense imaginative life alone,
in front of a mirror and trying on
new heads. Dorothy, of course,
came by her fantasy world honestly-and through that other version of self in the mirror she has
access (or believes she does) to a
world independent of her. She
treats the mirror as a window
rather than as a reflection. This
distinction is perilously subtle, however. We are asked to agree that
something resembling narciSSism
and terminal subjectivity is really
nothing of the sort.
Dorothy's predicament will continue to seem pitiable until we recall the end of The Wizard. The
new Dorothy has at least learned
when to keep her mouth shut. She
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cannot commit herself wholeheartedly to Kansas, she makes no
promises to stay there forever, but
neither does she stop functioning
in her everyday world. If she has to
walk a tightrope, so be it. The diverse materials of Baum's Oz cycle
and doubling gimmicks borrowed
from MGM's Wizard have thus been
newly interpreted: assimilated to a

one
story
which
replaces
philosophy of home with another.
Not quite a dream but not a socially shareable reality either, Oz
has become the means by which
one heroine draws back a little-by
which she avoids the return to
emotional infancy forced on that
other Dorothy Gale of the movies.

••
••

New Praises
Now that the river's flow and mountain's form,
the shade of sky and bend of branches giving warning
can be Rearranged
the infidel is obsolete.
And spirit gods. And frenzied red epiphanies.
Filed like heathen clothed-along with
voodoo drum and sacrificial knifeunder Those Imperfect Times.
Now that Man takes on dominionship without weight of
satan masks or dog teeth chains,
turns water into More
without imploring gods of thunder, sun, or (to be sure
of overlapping) anything,
makes from even excrement
antidotes his forebears only shrieked about,
sees through Divine, controls Creation, plumbs all
secrets without quaking,
guesswork's past. Terror's done.
Nothing stands Man can't work Over.
Harnessed now all ancient fickleness the painted savage
chased with panic-dancing.
Doused the superstitious pagan fires.
Every heretic has been converted. Therefore:
Praise we now the beep-buzz-hum reviling
full moon chant and tomtom thump.
Praise we, spirit-freed, the bloodless Good
now in the shadow of the shadow of
Original.

Lois Reiner
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Ruins and the
Fate of Nations
Gail McGrew Eifrig
I have just returned from a short
trip to England. The Editor said
that a deadline just a few days after
my return would be just dandy because I would have lots to say
about two cultures. Oddly enough,
he was right. The difference between old and new became very
strongly lodged in my thoughts;
while there, I saw hundreds of
ruins, and back in Valparaiso, I
found the vicinity of my office in
an uproar of construction for the
new law school. If that juxtaposition doesn't set some ideas in motion , you can't possibly be a column
writer.
The Old World certainly is old.
Obviously, England also lives and
thrives in the present, probably
moving as rapidly into the future
as any of its European counterparts. But it is nonetheless true that
the past is a dominant feature of
English life, just as stately homes,
cathedrals, and castles dominate a
good many views and skylines in
the landscape. Collections of old
things draw gasps of wonder from
the tourist from another era; is that
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really Jane Austen's bonnet? the
Duke of Wellington's sword?
Queen Elizabeth the First's glove?
Did Charles touch this very doorsill
as he stepped out to the scaffold?
No kidding-the Magna Carta? St.
Cuthbert's coffin? a Saxon arch?
Walking along the Roman wall, the
Hadrian's wall, nudging the sheep
and battling the misty drench, it
isn't that hard to imagine the
Roman legionary looking out over
the same damp landscape wondering if some Pict would dare to
come over the top of the outer
ditch.
The stately homes themselves are
mausoleums of the great age of
European civilization; in endless
marble halls are innumerable objects of glass, china, furniture,
painting, and sculpture gathered in
from the past-protected, restored,
refurbished, renovated, dusted,
catalogued. There is so much of it,
so many miles of those hallways, so
many tombs, so many ruins. They
must be good for something; they
must have some lesson.
It may be that, like the enigmatic
message of Keats' urn, they simply
say that "Beauty is all ye know on
earth, and all ye need to know."
The exercise of human skill and ingenuity in the production of all
these artifacts is immense, from the
delicate carving of Grinling Gibbons in oak panelled rooms to the
careful joining of stone and mortar
in the walls of Kenilworth Castle.
Beauty really matters there. In England one is continually confronted
with what is beautiful, in golden
villages splashed with roses, in
stained glass windows, in magnificent copper beeches planted at
exactly the right place to contrast
with the morning sun on a green
lawn. Furthermore, the beauty
created in the past is lovingly and
skillfully maintained in the present;
that lawn has been tended and
rolled this week, as well as for the
past three hundred years. Hearing

the choir at King's College sing a
Mass by William Byrd is to be in
the presence of an experience of
beauty both past and present. It is
also to be made aware that one is,
ineluctably, an American.
Though the American landscape
is one of great beauty, we are also
surrounded by vast areas of ugliness. And though as a people we
profess some slight interest in the
past, it is the present and the future with which we are most constantly in touch . Watch This Site.
The drive from O'Hare Field to
northwest Indiana on a muggy August afternoon must be one of the
world's least scenic. Filled with
wrecks of old warehouses not yet
entirely dismantled, pieces of outworn
machinery,
abandoned
houses, remnants of disused highways, billboards with half-messages-the entire landscape ought
to look as though people had
finished with it. Instead, there is
about the whole thing something
potential, something that asks to be
looked at next week.

Though the American
landscape is one of great
beauty, we are also
surrounded by vast
areas of ugliness.
Watch This Site. Whoever put up
that hopeful drive-in hamburger
stand has long gone, and he had
time to board up only some of its
windows. Did he leave because he
opened a bigger restaurant? (Now
Under New Management!) Or did
he go into the aluminum siding
business? Or has he moved to
Houston where he runs a carwash
franchise with his brother-in-law?
Or has he gone no one knows
where as his wife and kids struggle
to make it on welfare? It isn't beautiful, and it shows little sign that
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anybody cares what it will look like
tomorrow, but is the meaning of
the American urban landscape all
bad?
The fact that the previous statement is put as a question is important. America, notwithstanding its
bicentennial, is very new. And it is
still very much a question. Lincoln
knew that when he said that his
own age was "testing whether this
nation, or any nation so conceived
and so dedicated , can long endure." Its sense of potentiality is essential, and accounts for what fascinates Europeans about America.
We could do almost anything tomorrow, and there's no really good
way of predicting what that might
be, which is why the Englishman, at
least, watches America with interest, amusement, and an eye on
the door.
Picture the scene in the Western,
where the unknown cowboy comes
into town shouting and waving his
gun around, ready to spend money
and make a big impression. Is he
drunk? is he angry? has he just
struck gold? will he hug the lady
on the board sidewalk, or will he
pick her up to use as a hostage
when he heads over to rob the
bank? The town dwellers have a
phrase, a peculiarly American
phrase, for this oddball, this wild
card, this loose cannon; they refer
to him as "trigger happy." He
could shoot everybody in sight, or
he could buy everybody in town a
drink, marry the schoolteacher,
and save the new church from
being burnt down by the outlaw
gang. But who can tell until he has
done it?
Like the unknown cowboy,
America is more readily defined by
its future than by its past. Notwithstanding Reagan and company's speechmaking, there is no
going back to a "golden age" in
which America's true essence stood
pure and undefiled. Seeking for
that America is the most pointless
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task since Coronado wasted all his
resources roaming around the
Southwest looking for the Seven
Cities of Gold. America's essence,
which becomes clearer when we
look back at ourselves from across
the sea, is the future . If we are a
great nation , it will be because of
the way we meet tomorrow, not because of what we have done in the
past. More critical even than our
dealings with the USSR will be our
dealings with the Third World,
with the unknowns brought about
by the rise of powerful new entities
not dreamt of in nineteenth-century or early twentieth-century
schemes of diplomacy and international affairs.
It is more pleasant to think of
ourselves in terms of the past, and
in terms of our relationship to our
European heritage, because we
then look rather grand. As one of
the heads of state of the "modern
powers," our President looks well in
the group pictures with Thatcher,
Mitterand, Kohl, and company. But
those pictures of the group at Williamsburg last summer were revelatory and disturbing. The heads of
state of the old world looked as
sharp and trim as the buildings of
the restored town around them,

but that setting is a museum. No
one lives there. When our chief of
state really represents the American presence in the world, it will
have to be in some place other than
Rockefeller's lovely version of
American history. What do we look
like in the context of South Africa's
restless mobs? or Brazil's ravaged
economy? or Palestine's bombed
camps?
A
wonderful
English
stgn,
perhaps apocryphal, announces
that "These ruins are inhabited."
In many ways the English inhabit
their ruins with grace, making the
most of the past, cherishing its blessings, attempting the difficult business of getting on with less. If the
time comes when America needs to
live in its ruins, we could do worse
than learn from them. But for the
present, it seems we would do better to find new ways of responding
to the world than to try to work
out of our past. It is an article of
faith that we must learn from history, but no one, not even the historians, can tell us what we ought
to learn, except perhaps that readiness to meet change is all important in the lives of nations. The
American sign reads "Coming Soon
"
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Flashback
Dot Nuechterlein
It was a trip well worth taking.
We had moved from the community permanently four years previously, and this was our first visit
back. Two of us had lived there as
foreigners for seventeen yearsmost of our adulthood; three were
born there and had spent most of
their childhood in that place.
Crossing the border brought a
sense of deja vu: it had happened
so many times before. Yet there
was one extraordinary difference.
Often in the past I had traveled
through tunnel or over bridge with
misty eyes and lumpy throat, not
wanting the stay in the U.S. to end,
wondering when I might be returning "home" again. This time,
though, I genuinely looked forward to visiting friends, seeing the
sights from a tourist's vantage
point, and noting changes that had
occurred in our absence.
In my teenage years I had been
intrigued by the idea of living in
another country, and as a recent
college graduate I had been
privileged to spend several months
in Europe, where the thought of
moving abroad had intensified. Yet
the actual experience had proven
to be a decidedly mixed blessing: a
few years of feeling adventurous,
followed by a decade and a half of
yearning to return to my birthland.
Americans as diverse as the Black
writer James Baldwin and the
Norman
Jewish
intellectual
Podhoretz have mentioned in their
autobiographies the fact that living
overseas made them conscious of
their American-ness, and that happened to me, too. Identity consists
of our likenesses to some persons
and groups and our differences
October, 1985

from others; living among those
with traditions, attitudes, and goals
divergent from our own tends to
heighten our awareness of the characteristics and opinions developed
within our original social group.
I had been raised in a family and
in an environment in which patriotism and the values of U.S.
citizenship were thought of as positive, but were not especially emphasized. I had already voted once
and was fairly well informed about
politics and public issues; yet I
hardly considered myself to be particularly civic-minded. The fact that
my tastes and interests and views of
history and culture had been
shaped by my nationality had never
entered my mind.
Moving to an anti-American society during the Vietnam war
brought things to a head in a
hurry. People automatically assumed that my husband was a draft
dodger and that we had come
North to escape the war-mongering
policies of our government. That
attitude was a bit of a shock to me:
in the circles in which I had moved
previously the war was not terribly
popular, but the question had at
least been open to debate. In that
new place, though, there was no
other side of the story to contemplate or discuss .
That turned out to be the pattern quite often over the years. It
wasn't so much that I supported
the decisions and actions of the
U.S. unequivocally, but it did not
seem just that my government was
always, always pictured as being
wrong, if not evil and immoral.
Common, everyday practices were
criticized in the same way-it
seemed that all things American
were considered by many to be unprincipled, crude, stupid, motivated
by materialism, or worse. And they
said so. At great length and at
every opportunity.
I came to understand that some
of this negativism was to be ex-

pected: the powerful are not likely
to be loved and admired by the dependent. But it does get tiresome
when every newspaper one picks
up, every broadcast one tunes in,
and any number of casual conversations seem to follow the same line
of unreasonable reasoning.
Having read The Ugly American, I
tried hard to tolerate the situation
without fighting back, but that is
not my nature. Internally I became
increasingly depressed and resentful. I made some dear friends and
had some wonderful experiences,
but
as
short-term
residence
stretched into long a sense of despair shadowed the good times and
threatened to impair positive relationships. In particular I did not
want my children to grow up there,
learning to hate much of what was
a part of me.
Now we have been gone long
enough to add some balance to the
perspective. I am more able to
forget the frustrations of those
years and forgive the misguided
fervor and fanaticism that led to
some of the excesses I found so appalling. And I can say honestly that
I appreciate the opportunities I
had there to observe and try to understand human behavior; that has
been important in my professional
and academic life ever since.
In addition, I learned some lessons about myself. I am not, as I
once thought, adaptable to all circumstances. I could not be one of
those citizens of the world that are
sometimes written about in universalistic utopias. It turns out I don't
even automatically like everyone.
It was fun to return, to greet
some of those who had been important to me during a trying
period of my life, and to touch
base with some of the influences on
what and who I have become. But
I never once for a moment thought
that perhaps I may have made a
mistake and wished that I had
stayed. And I never will.
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For Good Reading
In a Glad New Year
In TimeFor Christmas
The herald angels' song is an everlasting antiphony ... It moves down
the centuries above, beneath, and in
the earth from Christmas to Christmas to Christmas ... In it alone is
hope before death and after death ...
Their song lives to the 2,000th Christmas, to the 3,000th, and at length to
the last Christmas the world will
see ... And on that final Christmas,
as on the first, the angels will know,
as we must know now, that the heart
which began to beat in Bethlehem
still beats in the world and for the
world . . . And for us ...
0. P. Kretzmann
The Pilgrim

A Free Gift Book for New Subscribers
Mail to:

0. P. Kretzmann, President of Valparaiso University from 1940 to
1968, was also Editor of The Cresset
from 1937 to 1968. In these two
rare books many of his beloved
"The Pilgrim" meditations were reprinted and are now available to
new Cresset subscr ibers as a gift to
themselves--or" to give as a
thoughtful
Christmas
gift
to
friends. This offer expires December
16, 1985. Current subscribers who
wish to purchase either book may
do so by sending $4.25 to cover
shipping and the cost of the book.

Many years will pass before you understand Christmas . .. In fact, you
will never understand it completely
. .. But you can always believe in it,
always . . . The Child has come to
keep us company ... To tell us that
heaven is nearer than we had dared
to think . . . To put the hope of
eternity in our eyes ... To tell us
that the manger is never empty for
those who return to it ... And you
will find with Him, I know, a happiness which you will never find
alone . ..
0. P. Kretzmann
Christmas Garlands
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